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Reputation Systems Bias in the Platform Workplace
E. Gary Spitko*
Online reputation systems enable the providers and consumers of
a product or service to rate one another and allow others to rely upon those
reputation scores in deciding whether to engage with a particular provider
or consumer. Reputation systems are an intrinsic feature of the platform
workplace, in which a platform operator, such as Uber or TaskRabbit,
intermediates between the provider of a service and the consumer of
that service. Operators typically rely upon consumer ratings of providers
in rewarding and penalizing providers. Thus, these reputation systems
allow an operator to achieve enormous scale while maintaining quality
control and user trust without employing supervisors to manage the
vast number of providers who engage consumers on the operator’s
platform. At the same time, an increasing number of commentators have
expressed concerns that the invidious biases of raters impact these
reputation systems.
This Article considers how best to mitigate reputation systems bias in
the platform workplace. After reviewing and rejecting both a hands-off
approach and the anti-exceptionalism approach to regulation of the
platform economy, this Article argues in favor of applying what the author
labels a “structural-purposive” analysis to regulation of reputation
systems discrimination in the platform workplace. A structural-purposive
analysis seeks to ensure that regulation is informed by the goals and
structure of the existing workplace regulation scheme but also is
consistent with the inherent characteristics of the platform economy. Thus,
this approach facilitates the screening out of proposed regulation that
would be inimical to the inherent characteristics of the platform economy
and aids in the framing of regulatory proposals that would leverage those
characteristics. This Article then demonstrates the merits of a structuralpurposive approach in the context of a regulatory framework addressing

* Associate Dean for Research, Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common
Good and Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I am grateful to Eric Goldman,
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David Sloss, and David Yosifon for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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reputation systems discrimination in the platform workplace. Applying
this approach, the Article derives several principles that should guide
regulatory efforts to ameliorate the prevalence and effects of reputation
systems bias in the platform workplace and outlines a proposed regulatory
framework grounded in those principles.
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INTRODUCTION
In the platform economy, sometimes referred to as the “sharing
economy” or the “gig economy,” the platform operator utilizes
advanced information and communications technologies to make
available an online marketplace through which a consumer seeking
a product or service matches with a provider of that product or
1272
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service.1 Principally by enabling efficient matching and promoting
trust, the operator allows for both the consumer and the provider
to minimize their transaction costs.2 The best-known platform
operators include Uber,3 Lyft,4 TaskRabbit,5 Handy,6 Fiverr,7 and
Amazon Mechanical Turk.8 More broadly, within the last decade,
platform operators have significantly impacted—some would say

1. PETER C. EVANS & ANNABELLE GAWER, CTR. FOR GLOBAL ENTER., THE RISE OF THE
PLATFORM ENTERPRISE: A GLOBAL SURVEY 5, 9 (2016), https://www.thecge.net/
app/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-Platform-Survey_01_12.pdf; RUDY TELLES JR., U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, ESA ISSUE BRIEF NO. 01-16, DIGITAL MATCHING FIRMS: A NEW DEFINITION IN
THE “SHARING ECONOMY” SPACE 2 (2016), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo94038/
digital-matching-firms-new-definition-sharing-economy-space.pdf
(defining
digital
matching firms as “entities that provide online platforms (or marketplaces) that enable the
matching of service providers with customers” and noting that digital matching firms are
sometimes identified as belonging to the “sharing economy,” among other names).
2. See JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF WORK IN
THE GIG ECONOMY 18–20 (2018) (discussing several ways that platform operators reduce
market frictions, including through efficient matching and promotion of trust); Valerio De
Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor
Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 475 (2016); Brishen Rogers,
The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 87–88 (2015–2016) (discussing several
ways in which Uber has reduced transaction costs that plague the taxi industry); E. Gary
Spitko, A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the Platform Economy, 70 FLA.
L. REV. 409, 431–33 (2018) (discussing why “[t]rust between consumers and providers is
critical to the success of the platform economy” and how platform operators build and
maintain such trust); James Sherk, The Rise of the “Gig” Economy: Good for Workers and
Consumers,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-andlabor/report/the-rise-the-gig-economy-good-workers-and-consumers (discussing how
software applications promote efficient matching in the platform economy); Erica Swallow,
The Rise of the Reputation Economy, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/ericaswallow/2013/10/09/reputation-economy/ (discussing the need for
systems that promote trust of providers and consumers in online markets); see also TELLES,
supra note 1, at 11 (defining transaction costs as “the time, money, skill, and effort needed to
facilitate a market transaction”).
3. See UBER, https://www.uber.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
4. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
5. See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) (online
marketplace for consumers seeking providers to assist with everyday tasks such as furniture
assembly, yard work, and grocery shopping).
6. See HANDY, https://www.handy.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) (online
marketplace for consumers seeking “highly rated pros for cleaning and handyman tasks”).
7. See FIVERR, https://www.fiverr.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) (online
marketplace for freelance business services such as graphic design, editing, and
digital marketing).
8. See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com (last visited Oct. 22,
2019) (“Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a[n online] crowdsourcing marketplace that
makes it easier for individuals and businesses to outsource their processes and jobs to a
distributed workforce who can perform these tasks virtually.”).
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disrupted9—a host of industries including transportation, lodging,
home cleaning, and home improvement.10
The rise of the platform economy presents a critical challenge to
workplace regulators—how best to balance a desire to foster this
new form of digital marketplace with the need to protect the
workplace interests of platform economy providers.11 To that end,
this Article considers how the law should address concerns that
reputation systems12 in the platform economy incorporate the
invidious biases of raters and that platform operators then rely
upon discriminatory consumer ratings as the basis for taking
adverse actions against providers. The Article proposes regulation
that seeks to minimize reputation systems discrimination in the
platform workplace in a manner that is consistent with the inherent
characteristics of the platform economy and mindful of the
purposes and structure of existing workplace regulation for the
traditional firm.
Part I of the Article discusses the utilities of reputation systems
in the platform economy.13 This Part then reviews concerns that
commentators have raised about the use of reputation systems by
platform operators, including that reputation systems may
incorporate the invidious biases of consumer raters to the detriment
of the providers being rated.14 Parts II and III focus on how best to
address reputation systems discrimination in the platform
workplace. Part II begins by considering the predicate issue of

9. See Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Dec. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation (setting out the
elements of the theory of “disruptive innovation” and bemoaning that “too many people
who speak of ‘disruption’ . . . use the term loosely to invoke the concept of innovation in
support of whatever it is they wish to do”).
10. Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH 61, 61, 63 (2016) (“Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, Handy, and other platform firms are
transforming industries by connecting ‘producers’ with consumers in new ways.”);
Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 95 (2016).
11. See TELLES, supra note 1, at 19 (“[D]igital matching firms are promoting debate
about how to capture the benefits of technology driven change without abandoning
important aspects of the current industrial organization, such as workers’ rights . . . .”).
12. See Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social Web, in THE
REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 3, 4
(Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 2011) (defining a reputation system as “an information
system that mediates and facilitates the process of assessing reputations within the context
of a specific community”).
13. See infra notes 22–52 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 53–95 and accompanying text.
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selecting an appropriate framework for regulating the platform
workplace. This Part reviews and rejects a hands-off approach to
regulation of the platform economy, which argues principally that
regulation threatens to unnecessarily stifle the promise and
innovations of the platform economy.15 This Part also considers and
dismisses as unsuitable an anti-exceptionalism approach, which
denies that the platform economy possesses unique characteristics
or presents novel concerns sufficient to merit special regulation.
Rather, this approach calls for wholesale application of the existing
body of workplace regulation to the platform workplace.16 Next,
Part II argues in favor of a structural-purposive approach to
regulation of the platform workplace.17 The structural-purposive
approach seeks to ensure that regulation is informed by the goals
and structure of the existing workplace regulation scheme but also
is consistent with the inherent characteristics of the platform
economy. Finally, Part III applies the structural-purposive
approach to the problem of reputation systems discrimination in
the platform workplace.18 This Part derives several principles that
should inform regulatory efforts to mitigate reputation systems
bias in the platform workplace and outlines a proposed regulatory
framework grounded in those principles.
I. REPUTATION SYSTEMS IN THE PLATFORM WORKPLACE
This Article focuses on the segment of the platform economy
that relates to the provision of services, rather than the supplying
of products. This focus on the provision of services follows from the
fact that the Article is concerned with discriminatory ratings of
workers but not of goods. Thus, the reader should think, for
example, of Uber rather than of Amazon.19 More specifically, the
Article is concerned with platform operators that would satisfy
each of the four elements contained in the U.S. Department
of Commerce’s definition of a “digital matching firm.”20

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra notes 96–125 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 126–70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 171–87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 188–295 and accompanying text.
See TELLES, supra note 1, at 6 (explaining why Amazon falls outside of the
Department of Commerce’s definition of a digital matching firm).
20. See id. at 1–4.
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Specifically, these operators (1) facilitate peer-to-peer transactions
using mobile software applications or other internet platforms; (2)
allow platform providers flexibility in deciding when and for how
long they will work; (3) require providers to supply their own tools
and assets needed to provide the service at issue; and, (4) of greatest
instant interest, utilize ratings by platform consumers to evaluate
providers.21 This Part discusses both the utilities of reputation
systems in the platform workplace and concerns that some have
raised about reliance on such reputation systems.
A. The Utilities of Reputation Systems in the Platform Workplace
Platform operators establish reputation systems consisting of
quantitative ratings or qualitative reviews by consumers of
providers and, often, by providers of consumers.22 For a number of
reasons, this Article is concerned solely with the former—ratings or
reviews by consumers of providers.23 Traditional firms have long
solicited consumer feedback and incorporated that feedback into
their decisions concerning workforce management.24 Reputation
systems in the platform economy, however, are far more powerful
than those in the traditional economy. The platform is structured
so that every consumer who utilizes the platform can be prompted
after each completed transaction to rate her provider and so that
the consumer can do so with remarkable ease.25 The end result is a

21. Id.; see also id. at 18 (proposing “a definition for ‘digital matching firms’ as firms
that use Internet and smartphone-enabled apps to match service providers with consumers,
help ensure trust and quality assurance via peer-rating services, and rely on flexible service
providers who, when necessary, use their own assets”).
22. Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1116 (2015).
23. For a thorough discussion of race discrimination by platform providers and
operators against platform consumers and the need to evolve public accommodation laws to
address this discrimination, see generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public
Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017).
24. See Gilbert A. Churchill, Jr. & Carol Surprenant, An Investigation into the
Determinants of Customer Satisfaction, 19 J. MARKETING RES. 491, 491 (1982) (noting the
emergence of consumer satisfaction as “a legitimate field of inquiry” in the early 1970s).
25. Josh Dzieza, The Rating Game: How Uber and Its Peers Turned Us into Horrible Bosses,
VERGE (Oct. 28, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/28/9625968/ratingsystem-on-demand-economy-uber-olive-garden (“Ratings help these companies [platform
operators] to achieve enormous scale, managing large pools of untrained contract workers
without having to hire supervisors.”); see also Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for
Non-Employee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1169, 1190 (2017) (“[T]he advent of the internet
and new social media tools have made soliciting customer feedback easier, faster, and less
expensive than ever.”).
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high rate of consumer participation in platform reputation systems
that makes feasible a scheme for management of providers that
relies largely on the reputation systems.26
Operators use these reputation systems principally to monitor
provider performance and, thus, to encourage providers to comply
with the operator’s quality control standards.27 In essence, these
reputation systems enable the consumer to become the eyes and
ears of the operator and to function as the operator’s on-site
supervisor of quality control.28 Thus, these reputation systems
allow an operator to achieve enormous scale while maintaining
quality control and user trust without employing supervisors to
manage the vast number of providers who engage consumers on
the operator’s platform.29
Platform operators typically rely upon consumer ratings of
providers in rewarding and penalizing providers. Thus, a
provider’s high composite score may qualify the provider for
preferential search listings, more desirable work, or higher
compensation.30 Conversely, an operator may “downgrade” a
provider based upon poor consumer ratings so that the provider
appears further down a list of options that the operator presents

26. Dzieza, supra note 25.
27. De Stefano, supra note 2, at 492.
28. Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37

COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 597 (2016); Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and
Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMMS. 3758, 3771 (2016)
(“[B]ecause there are no formal managers to oversee the quality of individual drivers’ job
performance, Uber’s system recruits passengers to perform a type of managerial assessment
through driver ratings.”); Alex Rosenblat et al., Discriminating Tastes: Uber’s Customer Ratings
as Vehicles for Workplace Discrimination, 9 POL’Y & INTERNET 256, 260 (2017) (“In Uber’s
driver-rating model, consumers act as middle managers of workers, both through the design
of the app and in the evaluation functions they perform.” (citations omitted)).
29. Dzieza, supra note 25; cf. Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1285 (“By removing the
necessity of preexisting community relationships, the Internet dramatically amplifies the
scale on which platform economy activity occurs.”).
30. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 61–62 (“Some platforms link quality (and quantity) of work
to some form of ‘elite’ status, which allows users access to better tasks and higher pay, or
ensures preferential search listings . . . .”); Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against
Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1218 (2018) (discussing Fiverr’s
“level up” policy based partly on ratings); Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 261
(“The reputations that workers develop on platforms through ratings systems . . . can
directly impact their earnings and opportunities for higher paid work.”).
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to consumers.31 Indeed, if the provider fails to maintain a composite
score above a certain cut-off, the operator may “deactivate” the
provider so that the provider no longer may utilize the operator’s
platform to match with consumers.32
Operators generally make available to consumers the
composite scores or qualitative reviews that providers receive on
the platform.33 Thus, of critical importance, platform reputation
systems allow for the building and maintaining of trust among
semi-anonymous strangers often from separate and physically
distant communities.34 Reputation systems are especially critical to
building trust among platform consumers given the nature of the
platform economy—in which a consumer initiates a transaction
online rather than at a physical space where a provider has
developed a community reputation, platform users who are parties
to a transaction are unlikely to know one another, and the parties
are unlikely to engage with one another more than once.35
Thus, consumers rely upon an operator’s reputation system, often
exclusively, to screen providers efficiently and to avoid providers
who the reputation system suggests might not be trustworthy.36
In this way, a platform operator’s reputation system helps the

31. Alex Rosenblat, There’s an App for Wrecking Nannies’ Lives, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/opinion/gig-economy-domestic-workersuber.html (“Ratings by [platform consumers] can reduce a [platform] worker’s search
ranking and their eligibility for jobs . . . .”); Dzieza, supra note 25 (discussing the downgrade
policies of Airbnb and TaskRabbit).
32. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that
Lyft may deactivate a driver whose customer rating falls below a certain threshold);
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1143, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing
Uber’s deactivation of drivers who fail to maintain a certain composite consumer rating);
Cherry, supra note 28, at 597.
33. Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1287–88; Participation Agreement, AMAZON
MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/worker/participation-agreement (last
updated Oct. 17, 2017) (providing that Amazon Mechanical Turk reserves the right to
“implement mechanisms allowing us and others to track your requests for, or your
performance of, Tasks and rate your performance as a Requester or Worker, and we reserve
the right to collect that feedback related to you and to post that feedback on the Site”).
34. ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND
THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 13 (2016).
35. Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1287–88.
36. Katz, supra note 22, at 1075; Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1288–89; TELLES, supra
note 1, at 14 (“Digital matching firms, via rating systems within their platforms, have
provided the consumer an efficient mechanism through which they are willing to trust
complete strangers to provide goods and services.”).
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operator and consumers avoid the “lemons problem” that
otherwise would plague the platform.37
Long before the rise of the platform economy, George Akerlof
described the “market for lemons” in a 1970 paper for which he
later was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics.38 The market for
lemons is characterized by asymmetrical information—the seller
knows better than the buyer the quality of a good or service before
purchase.39 When a buyer cannot tell the quality of a good or service
before purchase, that buyer will be willing to pay only for the
average quality of the good or service. Thus, high-quality providers
will be underpaid and low-quality providers will be overpaid.40
This dynamic will cause high-quality providers to leave the market,
further reducing the average quality of providers.41 In the end, only
low-quality providers will remain in the market.42 The solution to
the lemons problem is signaling—a means for high-quality
providers to convey to buyers their high quality.43 A reliable
reputation system is one such means of signaling.44
Indeed, without a sound reputation system, many platforms
would become a market for lemons, characterized by information
asymmetry, where consumers have insufficient knowledge about
provider quality and providers similarly lack adequate knowledge

37. See generally Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and
Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem,” 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 830 (2016).
See also PRASSL, supra note 2, at 53 (describing “what economists call the ‘lemons problem’[:]
When hiring a worker over the Internet, it’s nearly impossible to know how good they will
be, with negative consequences for all involved. Good workers will be underpaid and bad
ones overpaid, with firms potentially unwilling to hire anyone.”).
38. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
39. Id. at 489.
40. Id. at 489–90.
41. Id. at 488, 489–90, 493.
42. Id. at 495.
43. Id. at 499–500 (discussing how the brand-name good “counteracts the effects of
quality uncertainty”).
44. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 87 (“The dramatic increase in information available
[through rating algorithms] about workers and consumers alike has gone a long way
towards alleviating the information asymmetries that traditionally plague two-sided
markets.”). Other means to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty include a warranty
or guarantee and a licensure scheme. Akerlof, supra note 38, at 499–500; Thierer et al., supra
note 37, at 858–63.
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about consumer quality.45 Parties might take advantage of this
ignorance about platform user quality and the consequent lack of
user accountability by engaging in shirking or other objectionable
behavior such as providing shoddy work.46 As a result of the
information asymmetry and the behavior it begets, in time, the
platform would suffer from “adverse selection” whereby higherquality providers and consumers would forsake the platform.47
A platform operator’s reputation system protects the platform
and its users from the lemons problem and reduces transaction
costs through a substitute for branding.48 The reputation system
serves a branding function for providers, suggesting a level of
provider quality and thereby fostering consumer trust or distrust
of the provider.49 The reputation system also allows the operator to
make a more informed decision as to whether it should have a
certain provider associated with the operator’s own brand or, in the
alternative, should deactivate the provider to protect the operator’s
brand and the consumer.50 The reputation system simultaneously
serves as a type of credit score for consumers, enabling providers
to gauge the desirability of entering into a transaction with a certain
consumer.51 In sum, by reducing information asymmetries and
increasing accountability, a platform operator’s reputation system
gives users an incentive to be on their best behavior when engaging
45. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peerto-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 120 (2015–2016) (“Most forms of
peer-to-peer exchange are characterized by asymmetric information.”); cf. J. Hoult Verkerke,
Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 136–37 (1998)
(“The labor market, like the used car market, can be understood as a market for lemons.”).
46. Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 45, at 120–21 (discussing this “moral hazard”
that might arise from information asymmetry); Spitko, supra note 2, at 421, 434–35
(discussing how quality control standards and the ratings systems that enforce those
standards by rough approximation “prevent a sort of tragedy of the commons . . . [in which]
consumer trust in the specific platform and the platform economy generally serves as the
relevant shared resource”).
47. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 45, at 120 (“[A]dverse selection . . . occurs
when the information asymmetry makes higher-quality traders less likely to participate.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
48. See SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 34, at 145 (discussing the importance of brand in
the “sharing economy”).
49. Katz, supra note 22, at 1116–17 (“[R]eputation systems serve a function similar to
a brand or trademark for [platform] providers.”).
50. Spitko, supra note 2, at 432–33 (discussing how quality control standards, enforced
through reputation systems, are an essential means for the platform operator to protect
its brand).
51. Katz, supra note 22, at 1117–18.
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in a platform transaction and thereby lessens the likelihood of
adverse selection.52
B. Concerns Arising from Reliance upon Reputation Systems
in the Platform Workplace
Commentators have raised a variety of concerns respecting the
platform economy’s reliance upon reputation systems to manage
platform providers. These concerns relate to the quality of platform
reputation systems, the economic effects of these systems on
providers, the increased emotional labor for providers subject to
the use of these systems, and invidious discrimination against
providers that these systems may enable. This Article next
discusses each of these concerns.
1. Quality of the systems
Some commentators have focused on the quality of platform
reputation systems. For example, a few critics have argued that
consumer ratings of providers generally are arbitrary and, thus,
reputation systems fail to distinguish meaningfully between highquality providers and low-quality providers.53 A related concern is

52. Id.; Min Kyung Lee et al., Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and DataDriven Management on Human Workers, 33 PROCS. ACM ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS.
1603, 1608 (2015) (reporting from their study of Uber and Lyft providers that the reputation
systems “promoted a service mindset in all drivers”); Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 28, at
3772 (“The ratings that passengers give drivers constitute the most significant performance
metric according to driver discussions.”); Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 259–60 (discussing
empirical evidence that reputation systems in the platform economy encourage platform
provider accountability); Dara Kerr, Should Uber and Lyft Keep Passenger Ratings Secret?,
CNET (Sept. 25, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/should-uber-and-lyft-keeppassenger-ratings-secret/ (“If passengers are aware they may get dropped rides [due to low
passenger scores], they might make more of an effort to be courteous.”).
53. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 62 (“Rating system’s [sic] sanctions aren’t just all-powerful;
they often appear to operate in an entirely unpredictable and arbitrary fashion . . . .”);
TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 98 (2d ed. 2017)
(“[R]eputation systems fail in their basic task of distinguishing high quality or trustworthy
offerings from lower-quality or untrustworthy offerings. There is no evidence that an Uber
driver or a Handy cleaner with a rating of 4.9 is better in any way than someone with a rating
of 4.6.”). But see Katz, supra note 22, at 1118 n.271 (noting evidence that platform reputation
systems quantitative ratings tend to be skewed to the extremes with most raters giving the
highest rating and a small percentage of raters giving the lowest rating and concluding that
“[t]he score therefore functions more like a ‘thumbs up’ or ‘thumbs down’”); Jacob ThebaultSpieker et al., Simulation Experiments on (the Absence of) Ratings Bias in Reputation Systems,
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that, frequently, a platform consumer may give a provider a lower
rating because of the consumer’s frustrations with use of the
platform app that have nothing to do with the provider.54 Thus,
platform drivers have expressed apprehension that they may
receive lowered ratings in response to the platform operator’s surge
pricing, problems with GPS navigation systems, the passenger’s
difficulty using the operator’s app to set a pick-up location, or the
provider merely insisting that passengers comply with the
operator’s rules and local laws.55 The chief objection here is that
providers may bear serious consequences, including deactivation,
arising from arbitrary or unfair consumer ratings.56
2. Economic effects
Other critics have focused more directly on the economic effects
of reputation systems on platform providers. Some commentators
have noted that a platform operator’s use of a reputation system
may tend to lock high-quality providers into that particular
operator’s platform ecosystem, given that a provider is not able to
transfer her high composite score earned through that operator for
use on another operator’s platform.57 The specific concern is with

PROCS. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION, Dec. 2017, at 101:1, 101:5 (2017) (reporting
on a four-part Mechanical Turk–based study in which the participants in each part “reliably
differentiated between low- and high-quality [simulated gig] work”).
54. De Stefano, supra note 2, at 478; Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 28, at 3772 (“By
design, systematic accountability for the whole interactive process is downloaded onto
individual drivers because passengers do not have the option to rate the Uber system in-app
separately from their drivers.” (citation omitted)); Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 261–62
(“Because the Uber system is designed and marketed as a seamless experience, and coupled
with confusion over what driver ratings are for, any friction during a ride can cause
passengers to channel their frustrations with the Uber system as a whole into the ratings that
impact an individual driver.” (citation omitted)).
55. Lee et al., supra note 52 (“[D]rivers noticed that passengers misattributed system
faults and negative experiences that drivers could not control to drivers themselves, which
in turn resulted in lower ratings (e.g., surge pricing, traffic jams, GPS errors[,] etc.).”);
Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 262.
56. See De Stefano, supra note 2, at 478 (“[Negative ratings] might have severe
implications on [platform providers’] ability to work or earn in the future as the possibilities
to continue working with a particular app or to accede to better-paying jobs on
crowdsourcing platforms are strictly dependent on the rates and reviews of past activities.”);
id. at 488.
57. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 54 (“Rather than merely signalling quality, then, the real
point of rating algorithms is to control workers—both on a day-to-day basis and by locking
them into a particular platform’s ecosystem.”); Dellarocas, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing how
reputation “constitutes a powerful form of lock-in”).
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providers who invest significant time and effort on a particular
platform building a reputation score that is both high and
durable—the latter because the score is based on a large number of
ratings that will outweigh a few future low ratings. Such a provider
may become reluctant to abandon that platform, and her high and
durable reputation score, to start from scratch with a different
platform.58 Further, Jeremias Prassl has argued that this lock-in
effect may also negatively impact the operator’s competitors and
would-be competitors: “Algorithmic ratings . . . are an attempt to
make life difficult for competitors, who cannot gain the necessary
momentum when workers and, to a lesser extent, consumers would
have to start from scratch after defecting.”59 Thus, a number of
commentators have called for regulation mandating portability
of platform reputation scores so that a provider might use
her high reputation score earned on one platform on a
competitor platform.60
Portability, however, would have drawbacks for the platform
economy. Most significantly, portability of provider reputation
scores would arguably make certain reputation scores less
meaningful for consumers.61 For example, a provider’s excellent
reputation score earned while the provider was a driver on Uber
may be a poor predictor of the provider’s quality as a plumber
on TaskRabbit.62

58. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 87–88 (“[T]wo of the most important functions of
algorithmic ratings are to control workers—and to lock them into a particular app’s
‘eco-system’: ratings need to be built up over time and cannot be taken from one platform to
another.”); Dzieza, supra note 25 (“For a worker who spends weeks or months building up a
durable reputation on a particular platform, leaving for a competitor means starting
from scratch.”).
59. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 88.
60. See id. at 111–12 (“A system of portable ratings would empower workers to follow
up grievances and negotiate for better conditions—or to move on to a different platform.”);
Dzieza, supra note 25 (discussing portability as a means to increase provider
bargaining power).
61. See Randy Farmer, Web Reputation Systems and the Real World, in THE REPUTATION
SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD, supra note 12, at 13,
21 (“[G]ood reputation has limited context. Naïvely combining scores from diverse contexts
makes the calculation about no context at all.”).
62. Cf. Johannes Sänger & Günther Pernul, Interactive Reputation Systems: How to Cope
with Malicious Behavior in Feedback Mechanisms, 60 BUS. INFO. SYS. ENGINEERING 273, 275 (2018)
(“In reputation systems that do not consider transaction context, . . . a malicious actor could
show a discriminating behavior in different situations such as selling high quality chewing
gum but low quality laptops.”).

1283

003.SPITKO_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:53 PM

2019

Further, the lock-in effect of reputation systems in the platform
economy is not unique to the platform economy. Seniority systems
in the traditional workplace have a similar effect in incentivizing
employees to remain with their present employer.63 Workplace law
has long tolerated and even favored such seniority systems.64
Indeed, seniority systems would seem to have a greater lock-in
effect than do platform economy reputation systems, given the
characteristic greater flexibility afforded to providers in the
platform economy. An employee of a traditional firm may be
limited with respect to her freedom to work simultaneously at a
competitor firm.65 Thus, such an employee would be precluded
from beginning to build seniority at the competitor firm while
remaining employed with her longer-term employer.
Platform operators, however, tout the flexibility that the
platform economy affords providers, including the freedom of
providers to engage with consumers on multiple platforms.66
Indeed, for example, many platform drivers engage with
passengers through both the Uber and Lyft platforms.67 Thus, a
platform provider has the ability to begin to build a high and
durable reputation score with a competitor firm while continuing

63. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002) (“[Seniority systems]
encourage employees to invest in the employing company, accepting ‘less than their value
to the firm early in their careers’ in return for greater benefits in later years.”
(citation omitted)).
64. See id. at 403–05 (holding that an assignment proposed as an accommodation
under the Americans with Disabilities Act that would interfere with the rules of a seniority
system “will not be reasonable in the run of cases”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 79–81 (1977) (holding that Title VII does not require an employer to abrogate
the seniority rights of some employees to accommodate the religious needs of
another employee).
65. See Scanwell Freight Express STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Mo. 2005)
(“[T]he most common manifestation of the duty of loyalty . . . is that an employee has a duty
not to compete with his or her employer concerning the subject matter of employment.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (explaining that an
agent may not “solicit customers for [a] rival business . . . [or] do other similar acts in direct
competition with the employer’s business” during her employment).
66. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C–13–3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *17
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (noting Uber’s claim that it allows its providers to work with other
firms including simultaneously with Uber’s rideshare competitors).
67. Sherk, supra note 2 (“[D]rivers often seek clients through both Uber and Lyft
simultaneously.”); Miranda Katz, This App Lets Drivers Juggle Competing Uber and Lyft Rides,
WIRED (Feb. 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/this-app-lets-driversjuggle-competing-uber-and-lyft-rides/ (“Nearly 70 percent of on-demand drivers work for
both Uber and Lyft, and one-quarter drive for more than just those two . . . .”).
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to engage consumers through the platform on which she has
already built a high and durable reputation score.
3. Emotional labor
Other commentators have suggested that platform reputation
systems force platform providers to engage in relatively greater
amounts of sometimes demeaning “emotional labor” in exchange
for positive ratings.68 The concern is that providers must “suppress
or contain their emergent emotions to present a placating or
welcoming demeanor to customers, regardless of that customer’s
reciprocal emotional state.”69 Brishen Rogers, for example,
contrasts platform drivers, who are obligated to perform emotional
labor to maintain high ratings, with cab drivers who “can afford to
be themselves—which may involve venting their frustrations at
long hours and low pay.”70
In a sense, this criticism respecting emotional labor is an
acknowledgment that reputation systems are well-designed to
achieve their intended aim of promoting high-quality service.
Moreover, it is highly questionable whether workplace regulation
should be concerned per se with a worker’s right to refrain from
being pleasant to the consumer for whom she provides a service.
Rogers raises the additional concern, however, that “emotional
labor may impose a disparate burden on racial minorities” in that

68. Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild coined the term “emotional labor.” See ARLIE
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING
7 (1st ed. 1983).
69. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 28, at 3775; see also De Stefano, supra note 2, at 478
(“Particularly for activities that are carried out in the physical world, this also requires a
significant amount of ‘emotional labor’: to show kindness and be cheerful with customers as
this would likely affect the rating of one’s work.”); Dzieza, supra note 25 (“[R]atings result in
a sort of coerced friendliness, emotional labor markedly different from unrated taxi
drivers.”); Luke Stark, Recognizing the Role of Emotional Labor in the On-Demand Economy,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/recognizing-the-role-ofemotional-labor-in-the-on-demand-economy (“As a result [of platform reputation systems],
on-demand workers end up performing outsize amounts of what sociologists call ‘emotional
labor’ . . . .”); cf. Lee et al., supra note 52, at 1610 (discussing the effects of platform rating
systems and concluding that “[t]rying to deliver good services for all service interactions
could pose psychological stress to [platform economy] workers”); Christoph Lutz et al.,
Emotional Labor in the Sharing Economy, 51 PROCS. HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 636, 640, 642
(2018) (“Consumers of sharing economy services perform relatively high levels of emotional
labor . . . . [G]reater exposure to the sharing economy increased the level of emotional labor,
suggesting an element of behavioral change.”).
70. Rogers, supra note 2, at 97.
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“[m]inority drivers, to retain high ratings, may need to overcome
white passengers’ preconceptions, which can involve ‘identity
work,’ or a conscious effort to track white, middle-class norms.”71
This specific concern raises the more general issue of the conscious
and unconscious biases of raters.72
4. Discrimination
A frequently discussed concern, which is the focus of this
Article, is that platform reputation systems ratings may enable
invidious discrimination against providers.73 Specifically, critics
allege that platform consumer ratings are influenced by the raters’
biases, whether conscious or unconscious.74 Thus, platform
71. Id. at 97–98.
72. An unconscious or implicit bias is an unconscious association between a certain

trait, such as a specific race, gender, or sexual orientation, and a particular value. These
implicit biases may feed into one’s attitudes toward persons possessing those certain traits.
See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006) (discussing the pervasive nature of implicit bias and
its association with race discrimination); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1507–1535 (2005) (discussing implications of a “lack [of] introspective access to the
racial meanings embedded within our racial schemas”). Unconscious bias has been the focus
of increased national attention recently in light of a significant number of instances in which
police have been called on to investigate people of color engaged in otherwise routine
behavior, such as sitting in a Starbucks, touring a college campus, napping in a university
dormitory lounge, checking out of an Airbnb rental, and golfing—reportedly too slowly.
See, e.g., Christina Caron, Yale Police Are Called over a Black Student Napping in Her Building,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2018, at A21; Jacey Fortin, Settlement is Reached over Arrests at
Starbucks, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2018, at B3; Tyler Pager, Black Resident Is Accused of Not Living
in Building, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2018, at A19; Daniel Victor, Napping and Golfing While Black
Raise Suspicion, and the Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2018, at A19.
73. See, e.g., Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 263–65 (“In Uber’s case, any biases held
by passengers may be funneled through the ratings model feedback mechanism and could
have a disproportionately adverse impact on drivers who, for example, are people of color.”);
see also, e.g., Lobel, supra note 10, at 166 (“While the mutual rating and review systems widely
adopted on the platform have positive implications for trust and credibility, rating systems
may also be affected by biases informed by attitudes on race, sexual orientation, or
disability.”); Greg Harman, The Sharing Economy Is Not as Open as You Might Think, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/nov/12/
algorithms-race-discrimination-uber-lyft-airbnb-peer (discussing concerns that “Uber’s
rating system leaves it open for abuse” through customer discrimination).
74. See, e.g., PRASSL, supra note 2, at 62 (“[Platform ratings] might, on occasion, be
downright racist or sexist.”); Cherry, supra note 28, at 597 (“Some have alleged that these
ratings could be reflecting racial or religious bias, whether conscious or unconscious and are
problematic as such.”); Levy & Barocas, supra note 30, at 1223–24 (“Though [a platform
reputation system] can provide a basis for trust and reliability with unknown parties, it is
also likely to be [affected] by users’ implicit biases and may therefore result in systematically
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operators carry out consumer biases when they rely on consumer
ratings to make decisions that affect providers.75
Given the frequency with which concerns of reputation systems
discrimination in the platform workplace have been raised,76 one
might expect to find ample evidence of such discrimination. In fact,
only a handful of empirical studies have focused specifically on the
issue. This lack of extensive empirical evidence directly on point
may be explained, at least in part, by the difficulty that researchers
would have in obtaining access to platform reputation systems
ratings data and platform provider characteristics.77
That being said, the few empirical studies specifically focusing
on reputation systems bias in the platform workplace have
produced some evidence of invidious bias.78 Anikó Hannák and her

worse outcomes for users from marginalized groups.”); Rogers, supra note 2, at 95
(“Discrimination seems to be a risk of Uber’s rider-feedback model . . . [in that p]assengers
may give bad reviews to racial-minority drivers, whether out of implicit or explicit bias.”);
cf. Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309, 311
(2016) (“Platforms increase discrimination by identifying customers with picture-based
profiles which reveal their race or racially-identified names.”).
75. See, e.g., Levy & Barocas, supra note 30, at 1220 (“[I]f platforms make material
employment determinations based on consumer-sourced ratings, they may create a facially
neutral avenue through which discrimination can creep into employment decisions . . . .”);
Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 263 (“If a platform bases material employment
determinations on such ratings, these systems—while appearing outwardly neutral—can
operate as vehicles through which consumer bias can adversely impact protected groups.”);
Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?: The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced
Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 75 (2016) (“Uber may be discriminating
against drivers on the basis of race, sex, religion, and other protected categories by acting on
the discriminatory ratings of passengers; for instance, if passengers tend to give black drivers
lower ratings.”).
76. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
77. See Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 263 (“Without analysis of (and access to)
both ratings data and information about worker characteristics, we cannot
determine unequivocally whether consumer-sourced ratings . . . are, in the aggregate,
racially biased . . . .”).
78. At the same time, some empirical studies directly on point have failed to show
evidence of bias in platform reputation systems. See Cody Cook et al., The Gender Earnings
Gap in the Gig Economy: Evidence from over a Million Rideshare Drivers 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24732, 2018) (“[T]he average of [Uber] rider ratings of
drivers is statistically indistinguishable between genders.”); Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and
Gender Discrimination in Transport Network Companies 10 n.5, 18 n.9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22776, 2016) (finding that the race of consumer passengers did
not influence ratings by Uber and Lyft drivers); Thebault-Spieker et al., supra note 53, at
101:15 (reporting on a four-part Mechanical Turk–based study in which the authors found
no significant race or gender bias in participant ratings of “simulated gig work” after
participants had been provided with race and gender information about the (simulated)
provider who created it).
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colleagues studied ratings of providers on the freelancing
platforms TaskRabbit and Fiverr.79 They found that, on TaskRabbit,
providers perceived to be women received fewer reviews than
providers perceived to be men with equivalent work experience,
and providers perceived to be black received lower reputation
scores as compared to providers with similar work-related
attributes who were not perceived to be black.80 They further found
that, on Fiverr, providers perceived to be black received fewer
reviews and lower ratings than other similarly-situated providers,
and reviews of providers perceived to be black used significantly
more negative adjectives. Finally, the researchers found that Fiverr
reviews of providers perceived to be black women used
significantly fewer positive adjectives as compared to reviews for
other providers.81
In addition, Brad N. Greenwood and his co-researchers have
reported evidence of gender bias in the context of ridesharing
platform reputation systems.82 Greenwood and his colleagues
asked participants in their study to rate a driver in a (fictional) new
ridesharing platform after the participants were given a structured
narrative about the driver.83 The researchers found no evidence of
gender bias when the consumer experience was of high quality.84
They also found, however, that when the consumer experience was
of low quality, “women [drivers] are penalized to a far greater
degree than men, particularly by male raters [and] this penalty
accrues notably for highly ‘gendered’ tasks, such as the cleanliness
of the vehicle, while men are penalized more uniformly for
imperfect service.”85
Given the small number of studies directly on point,
commentators have reasonably extrapolated from empirical

79. Anikó Hannák et al., Bias in Online Freelance Marketplaces: Evidence from TaskRabbit
and Fiverr, 2017 PROCS. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & SOC.
COMPUTING 1914.
80. Id. at 1921–22, 1927.
81. Id. at 1923, 1925, 1927. The authors also reported finding a significant ratings bias
on Fiverr in favor of providers perceived to be women compared to providers perceived to
be men. Id. at 1923.
82. Brad Greenwood et al., How Unbecoming of You: Gender Biases in Perceptions of
Ridesharing Performance, 52 PROCS. HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 6581, 6588 (2019).
83. Id. at 6581, 6584–85 (methodology described).
84. Id. at 6584.
85. Id. at 6588.
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evidence of discrimination in other aspects of the platform
economy and of reputation systems discrimination elsewhere to
infer a strong likelihood that reputation systems in the platform
workplace are influenced by invidious discrimination.86 Indeed, a
number of recent studies suggest that users’ racial bias leads to
lower offer prices and decreased response rates in online
marketplaces.87 For example, in one such study conducted in 2015
and published in 2017, Benjamin Edelman and his colleagues found
that users of Airbnb88 with African-American-sounding names
were 16 percent less likely to be accepted as guests by Airbnb users
offering lodging than were users with white-sounding names.89 In
2016, in response to the Edelman study, Airbnb commissioned its
own study of discrimination experienced on the Airbnb platform.90
Following that review, Airbnb acknowledged that, indeed,
invidious discrimination on its platform was a significant problem
and implemented a series of policy and platform reforms to prevent
and address discrimination on its platform.91
Outside the context of an online marketplace, numerous studies
suggest that biases based on race, national origin, and gender
impact managerial evaluations of workers92 and customer
86. See, e.g., Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1276 n.14; Rosenblat et al., supra note 28,
at 263–65 (“Consumer-sourced ratings like those used by Uber are highly likely to be
influenced by bias on the basis of factors like race or ethnicity.”).
87. See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence
from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Apr. 2017, at 1, 17 (discussing several
studies); Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 263–65 (discussing several studies); Ge et al., supra
note 78, at 18–19 (reporting evidence of race discrimination by platform drivers with respect
to acceptance times, times for a vehicle to arrive, and trip cancellation rates); Jorge Mejia &
Chris Parker, When Transparency Fails: Bias and Financial Incentives in Ridesharing Platforms 21
(Kelley Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 18-59, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209274
(finding that racial minorities and riders who exhibit support for the LGBT community
experience significantly higher cancellation rates on a ridesharing platform).
88. The U.S. Department of Commerce refers to Airbnb as a “lodging digital matching
platform.” TELLES, supra note 1, at 5. Still, one might think of Airbnb as falling outside the
scope of this Article given that Airbnb intermediates access to an asset (a room) rather than
a service (work). See PRASSL, supra note 2, at 143 n.7 (excluding Airbnb from discussion of
the platform workplace because “the product offered [by Airbnb] to the consumer is use of
an asset, rather than on-demand labour”).
89. Edelman et al., supra note 87, at 2, 7.
90. LAURA W. MURPHY, AIRBNB, AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND BUILD
INCLUSION: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO AIRBNB (Sept. 8, 2016), https://blog.atairbnb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-BuildInclusion_09292016.pdf.
91. See id. at 10–12, 19–25.
92. E.g., Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 265 (citing several studies).
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satisfaction ratings.93 Together, this evidence supports the fear that
invidious bias very likely influences reputation systems in the
platform workplace to the detriment of providers. Moreover, to the
extent that such biases undermine the reliability of platform
reputation systems, reputation systems discrimination also less
directly negatively impacts platform consumers and operators.
Given the efficiencies of platform management by reputation
systems, use of the model is likely to spread.94 Thus, the issue of
reputation systems discrimination in the platform workplace is
worthy of study by regulators.95 Part II of this Article argues in
favor of a structural-purposive approach to frame that inquiry:
regulators should regulate platform operators qua platform
operators focusing on the inherent characteristics of the platform
workplace and giving due regard to the structure of existing
workplace protective regulation and the purposes the existing
framework seeks to promote.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING THE PLATFORM WORKPLACE
In evaluating how best to respond to reputation systems
discrimination in the platform workplace, it is useful to have in
mind a framework for regulating the platform workplace more
generally. This Part first reviews and rejects arguments for a handsoff approach that would refrain from regulation and for an antiexceptionalism approach that would simply apply existing
workplace regulation to the platform workplace. This Part then
argues in favor of a structural-purposive approach that would
regulate platform operators specifically, taking into consideration
the special characteristics of the platform workplace, the structure

93. Flake, supra note 25, at 1190 (discussing several studies evidencing race or gender
bias or both in customer evaluations of workers); Lu-in Wang, When the Customer is King:
Employment Discrimination as Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 283–85 (2016)
(same); cf. Gregory S. Parks, Race, Cognitive Biases, and the Power of Law Student Teaching
Evaluations, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (2018) (discussing several studies suggesting
that gender and race biases impact student evaluations of professors).
94. Dzieza, supra note 25 (“All the economists, investors, and even workers [the
author] spoke to were in agreement on [this] point.”).
95. See Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 223, 228 (2016) (noting “that the matter of discrimination by customers is of growing
importance” in light of the rise of the “sharing economy”).
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of existing workplace regulation, and the goals grounding that
existing structure.
A. A Hands-Off Approach
The primary argument advanced in opposition to regulation of
the platform economy, often focused on licensing regimes as
opposed to regulation of the workplace per se, is that regulation
risks stifling innovation.96 For example, Matthew Feeney has
argued that rather than level the playing field between platform
operators and their competitors in traditional firms by regulating
platform operators like their traditional competitors, legislatures
should deregulate the traditional firms, thus, “allowing
for innovative disruptors to enter markets.”97 At the same time,
a number of commentators have argued that the nature of the
platform economy—specifically its reliance on reputation
systems—obviates or at least mitigates the need for regulation
of the platform economy.98 The suggestion is that the platform
economy’s two-way rating systems encourage good behavior
on the part of the provider and the consumer and serve as a
type of regulation, promoting safety and good service.99

96. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 45, at 123 (“Applying a regulatory regime
developed for full-time or large-scale professional providers to smaller, semiprofessional
providers could create barriers to entry, stifling peer-to-peer exchange as well as the
grassroots innovation that the sharing economy facilitates.”); Matthew Feeney, Level the
Playing Field—By Deregulating, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.catounbound.org/2015/02/10/matthew-feeney/level-playing-field-deregulating (“In my view,
policy relating to the sharing economy must be as hands-off as possible, not least because
attempts to regulate companies such as Lyft and Airbnb in ways analogous to taxis and
hotels could limit innovation and be used to engage in regulatory capture.”).
97. Feeney, supra note 96; see also Thierer et al., supra note 37, at 876 (arguing with
respect to regulation of the “sharing economy” that “policymakers should level the playing
field by ‘deregulating down’ to put similarly situated competitors on an equal footing, not
by ‘regulating up’ to achieve parity”).
98. See, e.g., Thierer et al., supra note 37, at 874 (“[I]nformation markets, reputational
systems, and rapid ongoing innovation often solve problems more efficiently than
regulation . . . .”); Dzieza, supra note 25 (“Rather than a single certification before you can
begin work, everyone [who is a user in the platform economy] is regulated constantly
through a system of mutually assured judgment.”); Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government
Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), https://
www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldntregulate-the-sharing-economy/.
99. Feeney, supra note 96 (“Badly behaved providers and consumers in the sharing
economy do not last long, and the lack of anonymity means that anyone who does commit a
crime is unlikely to escape justice.”).
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Arun Sundararajan is a leading proponent of this perspective that
“[t]echnology enables digitally mediated self-policing” that can
reduce the need for government enforcement of regulation100:
Because salient details are made visible [through reputation
systems] not only to transacting parties but to the entire
community, sellers (and buyers) have to stay honest and reliable
to stay in business. In the sharing economy, reputation serves as
the digital institution that protects buyers and prevents the
market failure that economists and policy makers worry about.101

This peer regulation argument—relying on reputation
systems—speaks persuasively to control of consumers and
providers but fails to address adequately the need to regulate
platform operators for the protection of those consumers and
providers102 and, indeed, for the protection of society.103 For
example, it remains an open question as to whether the platform
operator is a “public accommodation” within the purview of the
Americans with Disabilities Act or related statutes or regulations.104
If the platform operator is held to fall outside the definition of
a public accommodation, it may escape disability law’s
accommodation mandates intended to provide equal access to
services for consumers with disabilities.105 Indeed, in the face of

100. Sundararajan, supra note 98; see also SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 34, at 150–52
(discussing the merits of peer regulation of the platform economy).
101. Sundararajan, supra note 98.
102. Feeney argues that “[w]ithout regulation it is still in the best interests of sharing
economy companies that their providers and consumers are not harmed and enjoy their
experiences.” Feeney, supra note 96.
103. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 45, at 117 (“[B]ecause the interests of digital,
third-party platforms are not always perfectly aligned with the broader interests of society,
some governmental involvement or oversight [of platform operators] is likely to
remain useful.”).
104. TELLES, supra note 1, at 18; Rogers, supra note 2, at 95–96.
105. Cf. Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1318–19 (observing that platform operators
“whose activities appear to implicate the same norms as traditional public accommodations
might be excluded by a narrow or literal reading of federal civil rights laws such as Title II”
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in certain places of public
accommodation on account of race, color, national origin, or religion). The power of disabled
consumers to give negative reviews is likely to be insufficient to incentivize platform
operators or providers to give equal access to consumers with disabilities. An operator or
provider may prefer to discourage use by a disabled consumer rather than accommodate
that consumer given that the cost of accommodation may be expected to exceed any potential
profit arising from accommodation. Moreover, one who is foreclosed or discouraged from
using a platform is less likely to rate the platform.

1292

003.SPITKO_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1271

8/5/20 9:53 PM

Reputation Systems Bias

allegations by platform consumers of egregious disability
discrimination, platform operators such as Uber have argued that
they are not subject to such regulation.106
A subsidiary argument favoring a hands-off approach to
regulating the platform economy is the fear of regulatory capture
by incumbent platform operators.107 The specific concern is that
incumbents will influence regulators to enact a scheme of
regulation that will raise barriers to entry, especially for smaller
companies, and thereby limit future competition.108 In furtherance
of this argument, Christopher Koopman points to regulation of the
taxi industry to illustrate the potential pitfalls of platform economy
regulation: “The general lack of competition caused by taxi
regulations explains the absence of customer care among taxicabs
that created the opportunity for ridesharing to become as popular
as it is today.”109
These concerns about regulatory capture should be weighed
against concerns that the structure of the platform economy will
enable the unregulated platform operator to generate even greater

106. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1082–84
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing Uber’s argument “that it is not a public accommodation under
the ADA”); Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civil Action No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087,
at *5–6 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015) (discussing Uber and Lyft’s arguments that they are not
public accommodations under the ADA); Jen Wieczner, Why the Disabled Are Suing Uber and
Lyft, TIME (May 22, 2015), http://time.com/3895021/why-the-disabled-are-suing-uberand-lyft/ (recounting allegations of egregious discrimination against disabled passengers by
platform operators utilizing Uber and Lyft and noting that Uber has argued in disability
discrimination lawsuits that, because it is a technology company rather than a transportation
company, it is not subject to disability discrimination regulations applicable to
public accommodations).
107. Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 45, at 123 (“Applying a regulatory regime
developed for full-time or large-scale professional providers to smaller, semiprofessional
providers could create barriers to entry, stifling peer-to-peer exchange as well as the
grassroots innovation that the sharing economy facilitates.”); Feeney, supra note 96 (“New
regulatory designations for the sharing economy . . . offer sharing economy companies the
opportunity to influence policymakers and engage in regulatory capture.”); Christopher
Koopman, Today’s Solutions, Tomorrow’s Problems, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/02/17/christopher-koopman/todays-solutionstomorrows-problems (agreeing with the argument that certain regulation of the platform
economy “will create opportunities for rent-seeking and regulatory capture in the future”).
108. Feeney, supra note 96 (arguing that regulation of platform companies “could be
abused by established companies such as Uber in order to limit competition”); Koopman,
supra note 107 (arguing that regulation of the platform economy will raise barriers to entry
and, ultimately, limit competition against incumbent operators).
109. Koopman, supra note 107.
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barriers to entry.110 Arguably, a greater barrier to entry than
regulatory capture and, thus, a greater threat to future competition
arises from the network effects that incumbent platform operators
leverage.111 Network effects exist with respect to a product or
service when the value of the product or service to the consumer
depends upon how many other consumers use the product or
service.112 With positive network effects, the consumer derives
greater value from a larger network.113 That is, the consumer’s
utility increases as more consumers use the product or service, and
the consumer’s utility decreases as fewer consumers use the
product or service.114 Language usage provides a helpful analogy:
The greater number of people who speak a language, the more
useful knowledge of and use of that language becomes.115
In the platform economy, as the number of consumers who use
a certain platform grows, that platform becomes more valuable to
providers, and as the number of providers who use a specific
platform grows, that platform becomes more valuable to
consumers.116 Thus, a consumer seeking a ride will generally prefer
a platform operator with an extensive network of drivers so that
she can be matched with a driver quickly no matter her present
location. Similarly, the provider seeking a rider will prefer an
operator with an extensive network of passengers so that she can
be matched with a passenger quickly no matter where she finds
herself.117 In this way, the platform operator’s true product is

110. See Kenney & Zysman, supra note 10, at 68 (arguing that “many platforms [broadly
defined] by their very nature prove to be winner-take-all markets, in which only one or two
companies survive” and that a resulting “monopoly position or even a strong oligopoly
might inhibit, or sharply constrain, further entrepreneurial efforts”).
111. See BRHMIE BALARAM, FAIR SHARE: RECLAIMING POWER IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
17–19 (2016) (discussing how network effects in the “sharing economy” enable platform
operators to exercise monopoly power).
112. SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 34, at 118; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE
L.J. 1, 45 (2000).
113. Merrill & Smith, supra note 112, at 46 n.163.
114. Id. at 45–46.
115. Id. at 45 (mentioning language as an example of “metaphorical” network effects).
116. Katz, supra note 22, at 1122 (“Sharing platforms benefit from indirect network
effects—the more providers operate on the platform, the more valuable the service becomes
for users.”).
117. SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 34, at 95; Spitko, supra note 2, at 435–36 (making this
point more generally).

1294

003.SPITKO_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1271

8/5/20 9:53 PM

Reputation Systems Bias

its network.118 More precisely, the platform’s providers and
consumers are the operator’s true product.
The incumbent platform operator’s ability to harness network
effects presents the threat of a significant barrier to entry for nonincumbents.119 Consumers and providers will tend to use the
incumbent platform simply because other consumers and
providers tend to use that platform.120 Thus, network effects may
give rise to monopoly power in the incumbent platform operator to
the detriment of non-incumbents and, ultimately, to the detriment
of consumers and providers.121
In sum, the need to protect platform consumers and providers
and to guard against market power arising from network effects
should outweigh concerns that regulation will stifle innovation or
lead to regulatory capture.122 Specifically, an operator’s decision to
deactivate or downgrade a provider can have severe economic
consequences for the provider.123 This critical importance of
reputation systems to the livelihoods of providers is a compelling
justification for regulating their use by the platform operator,
especially given credible concerns that an operator’s adverse action
affecting a provider may be a product of invidious discrimination
arising from the operator’s reputation system.124 More generally,

118. BALARAM, supra note 111, at 14 (pointing out that a platform operator’s “value is
not dependent on a finite product but on an infinite network”).
119. See Colin Rule & Harpreet Singh, ODR and Online Reputation Systems: Maintaining
Trust and Accuracy Through Effective Redress, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 175, 186 (Mohamed Abdel
Wahab et al. eds., 2011) (discussing how network effects led online auction traffic to
consolidate onto eBay).
120. See BALARAM, supra note 111, at 17 (commenting with respect to users of “sharing
platforms” that “it is more efficient to go where everyone else is already”).
121. See Dzieza, supra note 25 (“The question is how do we deal with the fact that
network effects are very powerful, so many [platform operators] will become quasi
monopolies.”). But see Rogers, supra note 2, at 92 (“While Uber’s success relies in part on
network effects—more riders and drivers enable a more efficient market—the switching
costs for riders and drivers appear to be fairly minimal.”).
122. See Katz, supra note 22, at 1109 (“Given the public interest in consumer and worker
welfare, absolute immunity for sharing platforms rarely makes sense.”).
123. Dzieza, supra note 25 (“If you’re dependent on a platform for work, getting
deactivated is less like an independent contractor getting a poor Yelp review and more like
being fired, having your livelihood cut off, except through anonymous and opaque reviews
and with very little recourse.”).
124. See TELLES, supra note 1, at 14 (“Service providers in the digital matching
economy are fully reliant on the digital matching platform’s ability to connect them
with consumers . . . .”).
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many platform operators have become too powerful and the
platform workplace as a whole has become too big to
not regulate.125
B. The Anti-Exceptionalism Approach
While some commentators have touted the potential of the
platform economy to transform the workplace,126 others have
minimized the platform economy’s importance for labor
markets.127 Indeed, a number of commentators have wholly or
largely rejected platform exceptionalism.128
The antiexceptionalism argument asserts that “[m]ost of the features
scholars point to as evidence of the exceptionalism of platform
companies are defining characteristics of almost all service
production.”129 Thus, the platform economy does not merit special
treatment with respect to workplace regulation.130 Rather, platform
125. Frank Pasquale & Siva Vaidhyanathan, Uber and the Lawlessness of ‘Sharing
Economy’ Corporates, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jul/28/uber-lawlessness-sharing-economy-corporates-airbnb-google
(“As allegedly ‘innovative’ firms increasingly influence our economy and culture, they must
be held accountable for the power they exercise.”).
126. See, e.g., Micha Kaufman, The Gig Economy: The Force that Could Save the American
Worker?, WIRED (Sept. 2013), https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/09/the-gigeconomy-the-force-that-could-save-the-american-worker/ (suggesting that “platforms
create a bridge between traditional enterprises and th[e] emerging [gig] economy” and
predicting that “the Gig Economy will itself become an engine of economic and
social transformation”).
127. See, e.g., Frank A. Kalman, Yes, the Gig Economy Is Great—But It Isn’t the Future of
Work, MEDIUM (Nov. 18, 2016), https://medium.com/@FaKalman/yes-the-gig-economy-isgreat-but-it-isnt-the-future-of-work-a5629f2b9e2d (arguing that “[a]ssuming the gig
economy is the future of work based on proliferation of a few platforms runs almost entirely
counter to the kinds of workplace cultures that leaders are working so hard to cultivate” and,
for this and other reasons, “gig work is likely to remain a small part of the overall labor
force, both from an economic perspective and a cultural, performance and
management perspective”).
128. See, e.g., Avi Asher-Schapiro, The Sharing Economy Is Propaganda, CATO UNBOUND
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/02/13/avi-asher-schapiro/sharingeconomy-propaganda (“That a smartphone or website mediates the exchange . . . does not
change fundamentally the relationship between consumers, laborers, and management.”).
129. Tomassetti, supra note 75, at 6–7; id. at 67 (“Terms often reserved for platform
work, like the ‘peer-to-peer economy’ and the ‘human-to-human economy’ would seem to
describe almost all service work involving customer interaction.” (footnotes omitted)).
130. Id. at 67 (“The sophistic appeal of the Uber narrative suggests that we need to
interrogate the coherence of the ‘platform economy’ as an empirical phenomenon relevant
to policy making.”); cf. PRASSL, supra note 2, at 6, 9–10 (rejecting “technological
exceptionalism” and arguing that the platform workplace “needs to be brought within the
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operators should be subject to the same workplace regulation as
any traditional firm.131 Julia Tomassetti’s query is representative of
the anti-exceptionalism critique: “Why do we more readily accept
that Uber intermediates between buyers and sellers, but that a
restaurant does not intermediate a market between buyers of
hospitality services (diners) and sellers (waiters)?”132
Generally speaking, Uber is far less involved in the actual
provision of the respective product/service than is Tomassetti’s
comparator restaurant. The structural differences between the two
firms preordain this result. More precisely, a typical restaurant
does not possess any of the defining characteristics of a platform
operator.133 The restaurant does not utilize an online platform to
facilitate the patron-waiter transaction, but rather utilizes a
physical space that it controls completely to host the transaction.134
The restaurant does not afford its wait staff the flexibility for each
to decide when and for how long she will work.135 The restaurant
does not require its wait staff to supply the assets needed to provide
the service at issue.136 And finally, the restaurant, unlike the
platform operator, has the ability to supervise and direct its wait
staff in real time.137 Thus, the restaurant need not and does not

scope of employment law” but also that regulators should “develop existing standards in
response to the specific challenges of precarious work”).
131. See PRASSL, supra note 2, at 93 (“Technology apart, the control exerted by ondemand platforms is not fundamentally different from the control exerted by other
businesses—nor should the baseline protection for workers be.”); Asher-Schapiro, supra note
128 (arguing that platform economy “[c]ompanies that profit from the labor of hundreds of
thousands of people should be forced to behave like responsible employers”); Dean Baker,
The Sharing Economy Must Share a Level Playing Field, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/02/11/dean-baker/sharing-economy-must-sharelevel-playing-field (speaking of labor market regulations and arguing that “it does not make
sense to have one set of rules that apply to incumbent taxi services and a whole different set
that applies to Uber”).
132. Tomassetti, supra note 75, at 77.
133. Contra id. at 6–7.
134. But cf. TELLES, supra note 1, at 3 (“Digital matching firms use information
technology (IT systems), typically available via web-based platforms such as mobile ‘apps’
on Internet-enabled devices, to facilitate peer-to-peer transactions.”).
135. But cf. id. (“Individuals who provide services via digital matching platforms have
flexibility in deciding their typical working hours.”).
136. But cf. id. at 4 (“To the extent that tools and assets are necessary to provide a
service, digital matching firms rely on the workers using their own.”).
137. But cf. id. at 3 (“Digital matching firms rely on user-based rating systems for quality
control, ensuring a level of trust between consumers and service providers who have not
previously met.”).
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rely almost exclusively on algorithmic management138 by
reputation systems.139
Each of these differences between the platform operator and the
typical restaurant speaks to the lesser degree of control exercised
by the platform operator over its provider as contrasted with the
restaurant, or numerous other traditional businesses in the service
industry, with respect to its employee. The degree of control that a
firm exercises over a worker or has the right to exercise over
a worker is a critical factor in analyzing whether the firm employs
the worker.140 Therefore, each of these differences, separately and
in sum, makes it far less likely that the operator will be found to be
the employer of the platform provider than in the case of the
restaurant with respect to its waiter or the traditional service firm
with respect to its worker.
The anti-exceptionalism project seeks to fit the platform
workplace within the existing framework of workplace protective
regulation. Yet, most U.S. workplace protective regulation applies
to a firm only with respect to the firm’s employees and not with
respect to the firm’s independent contractors.141 Thus, application
under the anti-exceptionalism view of the existing workplace

138. See Lee et al., supra note 52, at 1603 (defining algorithmic management as “software
algorithms that assume managerial functions and surrounding institutional devices that
support algorithms in practice”). A “sharing economy” worker has commented, “We do still
have a boss. It just isn’t a person. It’s an algorithm.” Andrew Callaway, Apploitation in a City
of Instaserfs: How the “Sharing Economy” Has Turned San Francisco into a Dystopia for the Working
Class, CAN. CTR. FOR POL’Y ALTERNATIVES (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.policyalternatives.ca/
publications/monitor/apploitation-city-instaserfs.
139. See Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for
Summary Judgment: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4 n.6,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-03826-EMC)
(Uber asserting that its “only insight into the quality of service provided by drivers comes
from passengers, in the form of star ratings or comments”). Moreover, the platform and the
restaurant differ greatly with respect to network effects. Unlike Uber, the restaurant does not
leverage network effects. Indeed, to the extent that the restaurant gives rise to network effects
that impact its patrons, it gives rise to negative network effects. A negative network effect
arises when a consumer’s use of a product or service reduces the value of that product or
service for other consumers. Merrill & Smith, supra note 112, at 45 n.162. In the case of the
restaurant, the restaurant’s increasing popularity will produce negative network effects
through overcrowding: the value of the restaurant decreases for the patron who is unable
to secure a reservation or who must wait an hour to be seated at one of a limited
number of tables.
140. Spitko, supra note 2, at 424–27 (discussing the traditional framework for classifying
workers as either employees or as independent contractors).
141. Id. at 423.
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regulation framework to the platform operator will make it far less
likely that the operator will be subject to workplace protective
regulation as contrasted with the traditional firm.142
Indeed, application of the existing workplace regulation
framework to the platform operator in the context of reputation
systems discrimination demonstrates the fallacies and
inadequacies of the anti-exceptionalism approach. Most federal
and state workplace antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (prohibiting discrimination in
employment with respect to race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin),143 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,144 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act,145 prohibit a covered firm from
discriminating against its employees with respect to the
characteristics protected by the statute but leave the firm free to
discriminate against independent contractors.146 Thus, a platform
provider who believes that an operator has subjected her to
reputation systems discrimination has no remedy against the
operator under any of these statutes if, as is likely under the existing
workplace regulation framework, the provider is found to be an
independent contractor with respect to the operator.147
Moreover, even if the platform operator were found to employ
the provider, the existing workplace regulation framework would
prove grossly inadequate at preventing, mitigating, or remedying

142. Cf. Edelman et al., supra note 87, at 18 (commenting that civil rights laws
proscribing certain invidious discrimination with respect to public accommodations “appear
to be a poor fit for the informal sharing economy, where private citizens rent out a room in
their home”).
143. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e–2(a) (2018).
144. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 630(b) (2018).
145. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5), 12112.
146. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is a major exception to this rule. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 proscribes race discrimination in the making of contracts. Id.
The Supreme Court has held that the provision applies to intentional discrimination in
employment as well as in independent contractor relationships. Johnson v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975) (“[Section] 1981 affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.”). The Court also has held,
however, that Section 1981 does not provide for recovery under a disparate impact theory.
Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 383–91 (1982).
147. See Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 267 (“In general, the unsettled nature of labor
classification with respect to platform-based companies imposes a significant hurdle
on prospective plaintiffs bringing a Title VII suit premised on discriminatory
consumer-sourced ratings.”).
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reputation systems discrimination in the platform workplace.148
There does not appear to be any reported case directly on point in
which an employee argues that her employer violated an
antidiscrimination statute in taking an adverse action against her
by relying upon a customer review grounded in invidious bias.149
Still, the Title VII framework illustrates the inadequacy.150 Title VII
provides for only two theories of recovery: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.151 In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff bears
the burden of demonstrating that the employer intended to
discriminate against the employee on the basis of a protected
characteristic.152 At a minimum, the plaintiff must prove that the
148. See Wang, supra note 93, at 277 (commenting, in relation to the traditional
workplace, that “management by customers may be especially difficult to challenge under
existing doctrine”).
149. See Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer
Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2170 (2018) (reporting that “by
the end of 2017 there still were no published court opinions directly addressing whether, or
to what extent, employers should be liable for using discriminatory customer feedback to
make employment decisions”); Wang, supra note 93, at 285 n.225 (stating that the author
failed to find any reported case addressing this precise issue); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the
Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1416–17 (2009) (posing a hypothetical in which an employer relies
upon a customer review that suggests a racist basis for the customer’s dissatisfaction and
reporting that “[n]o published decision is precisely on point”).
150. See Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 265–69 (“The legal protections against
discrimination usually available to U.S. workers (under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964) may be difficult to apply when customer-sourced ratings drive employment
determinations . . . .”); Wang, supra note 93, at 285–86 (discussing why reputation systems
discrimination in the traditional workplace “would be difficult to challenge under current
Title VII doctrine”).
151. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (“These
two proscriptions, often referred to as the ‘disparate treatment’ (or ‘intentional
discrimination’) provision and the ‘disparate impact’ provision, are the only causes of action
under Title VII.”).
152. The law governing third-party and coworker harassment claims presents an
anomaly. Zatz, supra note 149, at 1366–86. Where a third party or a coworker of a firm’s
employee has subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of the
employee’s protected trait, the employee may succeed in a disparate treatment claim against
the firm by showing that the firm knew or should have known about the harassment and
failed to take reasonable steps to stop the harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (noting that lower federal courts had “uniformly judg[ed] employer
liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard”); Galdamez v. Potter,
415 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (“This hostile environment theory of employer liability
[for customer harassment of an employee] is grounded in negligence and ratification rather
than intentional discrimination.”); Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir.
2003) (“When . . . the alleged harassment is committed by co-workers or customers, a Title
VII plaintiff must show that the employer either knew (actual notice) or should have known
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employee’s protected characteristic “was a motivating factor” in
the employer’s treatment of the employee.153 Thus, in seeking to
recover for reputation systems discrimination, a provider would be
required to show, at a minimum, that the protected characteristic
was a motivating factor in the operator’s decision to rely upon the
ratings in taking an adverse action against the provider.154
The typical provider would be highly unlikely to be able to meet
this burden in light of the utility of reputation systems to operators
needing to manage a large, atomized, remote, and widelydispersed workforce and the difficulty of demonstrating invidious
bias in reputation systems.155
U.S. Supreme Court case law does provide an avenue for
holding an employer liable for disparate treatment where the
decisionmaker did not intend to discriminate on the basis of a
protected trait but was influenced in her employment decision by
someone who did have such a discriminatory intent. In Staub v.
Proctor Hospital,156 the Supreme Court set forth a rule for such a case

(constructive notice) of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action.” (citing Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2000))).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m) (2018). Where the employer bases its adverse action
against an employee directly on a desire to accommodate a customer’s preference to not
interact with the employee based on the employee’s protected trait, the employer has acted
with the requisite discriminatory intent. Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908,
913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the
perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for treating
employees differently based on race.”); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
389 (5th Cir. 1971).
154. An employer may escape liability where it has acted to satisfy a customer
preference to discriminate on the basis of a protected trait if the employer can demonstrate
that the protected trait “is a bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1) (2018). Courts have recognized that customer privacy interests may support
a successful BFOQ defense. See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr.,
789 F.3d 979, 989–94 (9th Cir. 2015) (focusing on privacy interests in concluding that sex is a
BFOQ for certain prison guard positions); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d
128, 133–34 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that privacy concerns supported BFOQ defense relating
to child care specialist position at facility for emotionally disturbed and sexually abused
adolescents and children).
155. See Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 268 (“[I]t is precisely this form of rating system
which allows Uber to manage a large, geographically distributed, and transitory population
of 1.1 million workers worldwide.”); cf. Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1320 (noting that
“[t]he nature of the platform economy means most transactions take place online rather than
in person” and arguing that proving discriminatory intent in the platform economy “may
therefore be particularly difficult”).
156. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011).

1301

003.SPITKO_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:53 PM

2019

of “cat’s-paw”157 liability: “[I]f a supervisor performs an act
motivated by [prohibited] animus that is intended by the supervisor
to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a
proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the
employer is liable under [the antidiscrimination statute].”158 Thus,
where a supervisor gives a negative rating of an employee, the
supervisor is motivated by a prohibited bias in doing so, and the
supervisor intends for her own superior to rely upon that negative
evaluation in taking an adverse action against the employee, the
employer has violated Title VII.
A platform provider alleging that the operator relied upon an
impermissibly biased reputation system rating in taking an adverse
action against the provider would be unlikely to avail herself
successfully of the cat’s paw theory.159 In Staub, the Supreme Court
expressly declined to express a view as to whether the cat’s paw
theory would be available where an employee’s coworker who was
not the employee’s supervisor acted with discriminatory intent and
that action influenced the ultimate employment action.160 Still, the
Court’s reasoning would not seem to apply to a discriminatory act
by a coworker, let alone by a platform consumer.161 In either case,
traditional agency principles would not support imputing liability
to the employer.162
Finally, Title VII’s disparate impact provision makes it an
unlawful employment practice under certain circumstances for an
employer to “use[] a particular employment practice that causes a

157. Id. at 415 n.1 (discussing the derivation of the term “cat’s paw” from an Aesop
fable and Judge Richard Posner’s introduction of the term into U.S. employment
discrimination law).
158. Id. at 422 (footnotes omitted). Staub involved a claim under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.
(2018). Id. at 415. The Supreme Court noted in Staub that “[t]he statute is very similar to Title
VII[.]” Id. at 417.
159. See Flake, supra note 149, at 2202–03 (discussing difficulties with applying the cat’s
paw theory to customer discrimination).
160. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.4.
161. See id. (“Needless to say, the employer would be liable only when the supervisor
acts within the scope of his employment, or when the supervisor acts outside the scope
of his employment and liability would be imputed to the employer under traditional
agency principles.”).
162. See Wang, supra note 93, at 260 (“[B]ecause its analysis focused on agency law, it
is unlikely that the Court’s reasoning [in Staub] would extend to discrimination
by customers.”).
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disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin[.]”163 To succeed with a disparate impact claim, a platform
provider would not need to prove that the platform operator
intended to discriminate.164 Rather, the provider would need to
show that the operator’s reliance upon the reputation system gave
rise to an adverse impact against a protected group.165 Even if the
provider were to meet this difficult and expensive burden,166 the
operator could still prevail in the litigation if the operator were able
to demonstrate that its reliance on the reputation system was “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity[.]”167 Almost by definition, a reputation system such as
those that platform operators typically employ is job-related and
consistent with business necessity in that it is arguably the best
measure of the consumer’s satisfaction with the provider.168
In sum, in the context of reputation systems discrimination, the
anti-exceptionalism project arguing for application of the existing
workplace regulation framework to platform operators is not worth
the candle.169 Because the operator is less likely to be found to be
the platform provider’s employer than a traditional firm with
respect to its worker, the operator is less likely to be subject
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018).
164. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that

disparate impact claims do not require proof of discriminatory intent).
165. See id. at 1274 (plaintiff alleging disparate impact must show “that a causal nexus
exists between the specific employment practice identified and the statistical disparity
shown” (citing EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 735 (S.D. Fla. 1997))).
166. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 250 (stating that to demonstrate that a
particular employment practice caused a disparate impact “can be next to impossible to do
in the case of customer discrimination”); Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 263 (noting that a
platform provider lacks access to critical data and concluding that “[p]ractically speaking, it
would be very challenging for anyone other than [the platform operator] to do the analysis
required to investigate disparate impact of protected-class [providers]”); Wang, supra note
93, at 286 (noting that a disparate impact claim based on the employer’s use of customer
evaluations in the traditional workplace would be “difficult to establish”).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
168. See Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 267 (“Uber should be able to successfully meet
[the business necessity] burden based on data it is already collecting from its platform: it
seems probable that consumer ratings will bear some correlation in aggregate with a range
of different job performance variables such as rider satisfaction, driver safety, or successful
trip completion.”); cf. Flake, supra note 149, at 2209–10 (discussing the argument that an
employer’s “ability to consider customer feedback in making employment decisions is . . .
necessary to ensure customer satisfaction”).
169. See Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 269 (“Title VII [is] an ineffective means of
ending discriminatory employment practices that may be perpetuated through Uber’s rating
systems and similar mechanisms on other online platforms.”).
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whatsoever to most antidiscrimination statutes. Further, even if the
operator were found to be the provider’s employer, the applicable
antidiscrimination statutes are unlikely to provide an effective
remedy for the provider or deterrent for the operator.
Thus, workplace regulators would be better off focusing their
energy on efforts to regulate the platform operator qua platform
operator.170 This Article turns next to a structural-purposive
approach for doing so.
C. A Structural-Purposive Approach
The current workplace regulation scheme was not designed for
and is ill-suited to the circumstances of the platform economy. In
formulating a scheme that is more pertinent to the platform
workplace, regulators should keep in mind the goals that the
existing regulation framework seeks to achieve and how the
existing framework serves those purposes in the context of
the traditional workplace. The critical issue then becomes how
these purposes and the existing framework relate to the
structure of the platform economy. I label this focus a
structural-purposive approach.
A structural approach, as a mode of statutory interpretation,
posits that the meaning of a term or provision may become clearer
when the term or provision in question is placed in the context of a
whole statutory scheme.171 Thus, to ascertain meaning, one
examines how the term or provision relates to other provisions in a
statute or a body of law or how those other provisions relate to each
other.172 The theory is that “‘[a] provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings

170. Cf. Feeney, supra note 96 (arguing that “[w]hile some regulators are tempted to
regulate sharing economy companies like their competitors, to do so would be a mistake that
betrays a misunderstanding of how the sharing economy works” but arguing against
regulation of platform operators).
171. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“[W]hen deciding whether the
language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 133 (2000))).
172. See id. at 2490.
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produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest
of the law.’”173
Previously, I have argued for a species of structural approach
that I label a structural-purposive approach to aid statutory
interpretation in the context of the platform economy where neither
the text nor the legislative history of the relevant workplace
protective legislation under consideration provides reliable
indicators of the meaning of a statutory term.174 Specifically, I have
argued that such an approach would be useful in analyzing
whether the legislature that enacted certain workplace protective
legislation would have intended for a platform operator’s
reservation of the right to impose quality control standards on a
platform provider to give rise to employment obligations running
in favor of the provider and against the operator pursuant to that
workplace protective legislation.175 This interpretive analysis
focuses on both the structure of workplace protective regulation
generally and the structure of the platform economy to which the
statute at issue is being applied.176 Focusing on these elements
informs consideration of the critical issue—how would the
legislature that enacted the workplace protective legislation
framework for regulation of the traditional firm wish to achieve
the purposes of that framework within the context of the
platform workplace?
One might ask a substantially similar question when applying
a structural-purposive approach to statutory formulation for the
platform workplace: the issue becomes how a legislature should
seek to achieve the purposes of the traditional workplace protective
regulation framework in the context of the platform economy and
in light of the structure of the platform economy.177 The structuralpurposive approach seeks to be guided by the purposes
173. Id. at 2492 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
174. See generally Spitko, supra note 2.
175. Id. at 416–22.
176. Id. at 418–19.
177. Cf. GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW (2016) (arguing that
workplace law reformers should first articulate the goals of workplace law and then consider
how workplace laws should be changed to better advance those goals); E. Gary Spitko, The
Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV.
1063 (1999) (applying a structural-purposive approach to statutory formulation in the
context of succession law).
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and experiences of the traditional workplace protective
regulation framework without being constrained by that
framework’s shortcomings and limitations in the context of the
platform economy.
A concern that may arise with the use of a structural approach
as a tool for statutory interpretation is that the method leaves too
much discretion to the eye of the beholder. Thus, the Supreme
Court has cautioned, “Reliance on context and structure in
statutory interpretation is a ‘subtle business, calling for great
wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation
and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation
itself.’”178 Still, a structural approach is useful, at a minimum, as a
means to eliminate possible interpretations of a piece of a statute or
body of law that would be at war with the statute or body of law
as a whole.
The same is true of a structural-purposive approach to statutory
formulation. The mode of analysis is useful as a lens through which
to view and evaluate alternative designs for regulation. In the
context of the platform economy, the approach allows for the
screening out of proposed regulation that would be inimical to the
inherent characteristics of the platform economy and aids in the
framing of regulatory proposals that would leverage
those characteristics.
A counterexample may helpfully demonstrate the value of a
structural-purposive approach to regulation of the platform
workplace. Alex Rosenblat and her colleagues have studied rating
systems in the platform workplace and have focused particularly
on workplace discrimination arising from the use of these
systems.179 In light of their analysis of bias specifically on the Uber
platform, they have offered for discussion several “potential
interventions to allow the protections of Title VII to more effectively
extend into this new labor environment, and to limit the bias that
might affect consumer ratings and the employment decisions that
depend upon them.”180 Several of their potential interventions

178. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495–96 (quoting Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939)).
179. Rosenblat et al., supra note 28.
180. Id. at 269. Rosenblat and her colleagues clarify that their potential interventions

“are intended as a set of provocations for further reflection rather than recommended policy
prescriptions, and as a means of laying out potential alternatives[.]” Id.
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would greatly de-emphasize consumer ratings or even decouple
consumer ratings from outcomes for workers altogether.181 For
example, pursuant to one suggested intervention, consumer ratings
“might be used to inform a worker or the platform about
her/his performance, but not be formally fed into workplace
evaluation processes[.]”182
Such a proposed regulation that would require a platform
operator to decouple the operator’s reputation system from the
operator’s treatment of providers is inimical to the inherent
characteristics of the platform economy.183 Platform operators
depend upon reputation systems to ensure quality and trust in a
large, atomized, remote, and widely-dispersed workforce.184 Thus,
as noted, reputation systems enable platform operators to achieve
enormous scale without employing supervisors to manage the
provider workforce.185
Indeed, Rosenblat and her colleagues concede that their
potential interventions that would decouple ratings from worker
outcomes “imply reliance on alternative workplace evaluation
processes, which could present challenges to the scalability of
platform-based management.”186 Thus, such interventions are
inconsistent with a structural-purposive approach, which seeks to
ensure that regulation is consistent with the intrinsic features of the
regulated entity.187 Part III of this Article further demonstrates the

181. See id. at 270–73.
182. Id. at 273; see also Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 249, 253 (asserting that

“[c]ustomer evaluations are notoriously biased along race and gender lines” and proposing
a duty on firms that are subject to antidiscrimination laws to refrain from relying upon
customer evaluations of workers “unless they find a way to negate that bias”).
183. See PRASSL, supra note 2, at 13 (“[A]ll gig-economy platforms’ business models
overlap and intersect—with several crucial commonalities, including the use of algorithmic
rating mechanisms . . . .”).
184. Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 258 (noting that, for the platform operator, a
reputation system “is a scalable solution to maintaining quality control over a far-flung and
fluctuating workforce”).
185. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
186. Rosenblat et al., supra note 28, at 273; see also id. (acknowledging that another
suggested potential intervention “might run contrary to a platform’s business model
premised on the cost savings that come from deferring evaluations of workers
to consumers”).
187. A platform operator might refrain from acting on platform consumer ratings other
than to make those ratings available to all consumers who might then decide for themselves
whether they wish to engage with a provider whose reputation score falls below a

1307

003.SPITKO_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/5/20 9:53 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

utility of a structural-purposive mode of analysis in the context of
a regulatory framework seeking to mitigate reputation systems
discrimination in the platform workplace.
III. A STRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE PROPOSAL
TO MINIMIZE REPUTATION SYSTEMS DISCRIMINATION
IN THE PLATFORM WORKPLACE
This Part applies a structural-purposive analysis to consider
how best to address reputation systems discrimination in the
platform workplace. The analysis begins with an examination of
the structure and goals of the existing regulatory framework for the
traditional firm with respect to reputation systems discrimination
specifically and, more broadly, with respect to workplace
discrimination arising from customer preference. The analysis
continues with consideration of how this structure and these
purposes relate to the inherent characteristics of the platform
economy. Finally, this Part uses the principles derived from this
analysis to sketch out the contours of a proposed regulatory
framework to ameliorate the prevalence and effects of reputation
systems discrimination in the platform workplace.
A. Derivation of Principles
Derivation of principles to guide regulation of the platform
workplace pursuant to a structural-purposive approach begins
with an analysis of the structure and goals of existing workplace
protective regulation. The existing regulatory framework for the
traditional firm does not specifically target reputation systems
discrimination or discrimination arising from customer preference.
Rather, antidiscrimination law more generally prohibits firms that
employ a certain number of employees from discriminating against
their employees on the basis of enumerated protected traits, such

certain threshold. See Benjamin Sachs, Uber and Lyft: Customer Reviews and the Right-to-Control,
ONLABOR (May 20, 2015), https://onlabor.org/uber-and-lyft-customer-reviews-and-theright-to-control/ (arguing that such a system would lessen the likelihood that the platform
operator would be found to be the employer of the platform provider). A mere shift to this
variation would leave bias in the reputation system unaddressed.
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as race, gender, religion, age, and disability.188 As discussed, this
framework provides two theories pursuant to which an employee
might seek to vindicate her right to be free from invidious
discrimination arising from customer preference: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.189
This framework has two distinct goals. First, antidiscrimination
statutes seek principally to discourage employers from engaging in
invidious employment discrimination in the first place.190 Second,
these statutes seek also to remedy an employee’s injuries arising
from her employer’s invidious discrimination that occurs
nonetheless by providing the employee with a private cause of
action against her employer.191
Notably, this framework does not impose liability upon
customers for their own discriminatory behavior.192 One can
discern a principal rationale for this omission in the structure of
most antidiscrimination statutes: these statutes typically exempt
individuals as well as small employers from the scope of the

188. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 630(b) (2018) (prohibiting certain employers with
twenty or more employees from discriminating on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b),
2000e-2(a) (2018) (prohibiting certain employers with fifteen or more employees from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111(5), 12112(a) (prohibiting certain employers with fifteen or more employees from
discriminating on the basis of disability).
189. See supra notes 151–68 and accompanying text.
190. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254–55 (1994) (quoting Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975) (“[T]he primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one . . . .”).
191. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 254–55; Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418.
192. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 225–26. Bartlett and Gulati point out that Section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, arguably could be used to hold a
customer liable for race discrimination against a worker but has not been applied for this
purpose. Id. at 225 n.12, 247.
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statutes’ proscriptions.193 Title VII,194 the ADA,195 and the ADEA,196
for example, each applies only to employers with a minimum
number of employees—fifteen, fifteen, and twenty employees,
respectively. The small-firm exemption reflects legislative concern
regarding the impact on small businesses of compliance costs
associated with antidiscrimination statutes.197 As the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated, these exemptions
evidence legislative intent “to spare . . . small firms from the
potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of the
antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to assure
compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at
compliance fail.”198 Similarly, the present framework exempts
customers from liability for their own discriminatory behavior, in
part, to spare individuals from the significant costs associated with
compliance and litigation.
Katharine Bartlett and Mitu Gulati suggest additional reasons
for the customer exemption that are rooted in efficacy and
efficiency concerns as well as privacy and individual autonomy
concerns.199 Regulating the firm arguably is more efficacious and
efficient than regulating the customer given that the firm is easier
to identify and hold accountable, is typically the least cost avoider,
has a profit motive to eliminate certain inefficiencies arising from
invidious discrimination, and is otherwise already subject to

193. E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from Legislation
Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591,
646–48 (2009).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018) (defining “employer” for purposes of Title VII in part
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year”).
195. Id. § 12111(5) (defining “employer” for purposes of the ADA in part as “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working
day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year”).
196. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2018) (defining “employer” for purposes of the ADEA in part
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year”).
197. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003)
(asserting that the ADA’s small-employer exemption was intended to “eas[e] entry into the
market and preserv[e] the competitive position of smaller firms”).
198. Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999).
199. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 228–41.
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extensive regulation.200 Moreover, direct regulation of the customer
might impact choices central to her private identity and,
thus, might implicate societal norms valuing privacy and
individual autonomy.201
Although the antidiscrimination framework does not impose
liability upon consumers for their discriminatory behavior, other
branches of workplace law might be employed to do so. Most
pertinent to reputation systems discrimination is defamation law.
As tailored to the workplace context, defamation law might be used
to address defamatory statements that are a pretext for bias and to
redress damage to a worker’s occupational reputation.202
The ultimate aim of this structural-purposive analysis is to
further the purposes of the most apposite existing workplace
regulation in the context of the platform economy. Thus, the next
step in the derivation of principles is to relate these structures and
goals of the traditional framework to the inherent characteristics of
the platform economy. As developed in detail below, an analysis of
these structures and purposes yields three broad principles to
guide regulators addressing reputation systems discrimination in
the platform workplace: (1) even though the traditional workplace
protective regulation framework does not specifically regulate the
use of ratings or reputation systems, platform workplace protective
regulation should do so; (2) efforts to mitigate invidious bias in
platform reputation systems should rely principally on education
of raters and on algorithms to detect bias rather than on a private
cause of action in providers against operators; and (3) any private
cause of action for providers to vindicate their interests protected
under the regulation should be structured so as not to unduly
discourage consumer participation in or operator reliance upon
reputation systems.
Applying these three principles, this Part below advances an
argument for legislation that would provide for a two-pronged
effort to mitigate reputation systems discrimination in the platform
workplace. The first prong would mandate that platform operators
take certain steps up front to reduce the likelihood of rater bias.
200. Id. at 228–29.
201. Id. at 238.
202. See infra notes 260–84 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of

workplace defamation law).
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Specifically, operators would be required to educate consumers
respecting bias before those consumers engage with providers on
the platform, and, operators would be required to employ
algorithms in an effort to detect possible bias in their reputation
systems. The second prong would allow for a private cause of
action for any provider who alleges that (1) she has been harmed
by invidious reputation systems discrimination and (2) the
platform operator acted with “actual malice” in relying upon the
reputation system.
B. Regulation Should Specifically Target
Reputation Systems Discrimination in the Platform Workplace
Regulation of platform operators as platform operators should
specifically target reputation systems discrimination. This is so,
even though the traditional workplace protective regulation
framework does not single out reputation systems for special
treatment. The critical differences favoring targeted regulation of
reputation systems in the platform workplace are the relatively
greater importance of reputation systems to workers in the
platform economy and the relatively superior ability of platform
operators to detect and mitigate reputation systems bias.
As a general rule, reputation systems are of far greater
importance to the livelihoods of workers in the platform economy
as contrasted with workers in the traditional economy. As noted,
platform operators rely predominantly on reputation systems
rather than direct supervision to manage platform providers.203
Thus, a provider’s reputation score typically is the single most
significant factor respecting whether she is eligible for preferential
search listings, more desirable work, or higher compensation on the
one hand, or is downgraded or deactivated by the operator on the
other.204 Moreover, when an operator does downgrade or
deactivate a provider, the provider may have few options to replace
the consequential lost access to consumers: the network effects that
are an inherent characteristic of the platform economy may mean
that the operator enjoys monopoly power as an online marketplace

203. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
204. Supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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for the provider to engage with consumers.205 Finally, irrespective
of the operator’s reliance on its reputation system, the platform
provider typically cannot engage with a platform consumer
without the consumer first seeing the provider’s reputation system
score or reviews.206 Thus, even absent the provider suffering a
downgrade or deactivation, the operator’s reputation system
is likely to have a profound impact on the provider’s ability to
engage with consumers. In sum, the relatively greater economic
impact that reputation systems have on platform providers weighs
in favor of regulation specifically targeted at those systems in the
platform economy.207
A second reason to specifically target reputation systems
discrimination in the platform workplace is that the platform
operator is better-suited to fight reputation systems bias
successfully as contrasted with the traditional firm.208 The very
nature of the platform economy ensures that every engagement of
a provider by a consumer in the platform workplace leaves digital
fingerprints. Of particular relevance, platform consumers can be
linked to their ratings of providers, unlike most consumers in the
traditional economy who possess relative anonymity when rating
workers.209 Operators compile vast amounts of reputation systems
data and other data concerning their users. This data may be
employed in antidiscrimination efforts, especially in conjunction
with the use of algorithms.210 Indeed, platform operators, by their

205.
206.
207.
208.

Supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Leong & Belzer, supra note 23, at 1288 n.97.
Supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
See SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 34, at 142 (arguing that the platform economy
presents new opportunities to detect and mitigate invidious discrimination against
consumers given that “the peer-to-peer activity is mediated by a platform now, rather than
occurring in the more anonymous ‘physical world’”).
209. Cf. Wang, supra note 93, at 282 (noting that customers in the traditional economy
are usually anonymous in relation to their evaluations of workers).
210. Rogers, supra note 2, at 86, 90, 95–96 (suggesting that the data that Uber collects on
its drivers and passengers may be employed in antidiscrimination efforts); Noah Zatz,
Beyond Misclassification: Gig Economy Outside Employment Law, ONLABOR (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://onlabor.org/beyond-misclassification-gig-economy-discrimination-outsideemployment-law/ (“[T]he voracious appetite for data gathering and analysis characteristic
of these platforms . . . could be brought to bear [to fight reputation systems bias].”).
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very nature, have expertise in algorithmic management. Such
expertise lends itself to detection of bias on the platform.211
In sum, platform operators, providers, and consumers are
situated differently with respect to reputation systems as
contrasted with their counterparts in the traditional workplace.
Because of the distinct inherent characteristics of the platform
workplace, regulation of reputation systems discrimination that
would be unreasonably burdensome and utterly ineffective if
applied in the traditional economy might be well-suited to
mitigating bias in the platform economy. Thus, regulators should
specifically target reputation systems discrimination in the
platform workplace. Next, the Article details what that targeted
regulation should look like.
C. Bias Mitigation Efforts Should Focus Principally
on Education of Raters and on Algorithms that May Detect Bias
In general, the regulatory framework targeting reputation
systems discrimination in the platform workplace should rely
principally on education of raters and on engineering to detect and
block bias rather than on litigation to achieve its bias-mitigation
aims.212 As discussed above, litigation is likely to be relatively
ineffective at mitigating reputation systems bias.213 Under any
acceptable standard, a platform provider is likely to have great
difficulty proving that invidious discrimination significantly
impacted her reputation system composite score.214 Moreover, the
provider is extremely unlikely to be able to demonstrate that the
platform operator engaged in invidious discrimination in relying
upon its reputation system as the basis for taking an adverse action
against the provider.215 These difficulties not only will make it
unlikely that a provider will prevail in litigation but also will make

211. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?),
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1733–34 (2006) (arguing that algorithms can be used to identify
invidious bias in online reputation regimes and other public feedback mechanisms).
212. See Murphy, supra note 90, at 24 (“Just as teams of lawyers were assembled to fight
discrimination in the mid-20th century, it is my hope that 21st-century engineers will do their
part to help eliminate bias and set an example for other technology startups and companies
in the sharing economy to do the same.”).
213. See supra notes 150–68 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 150–68 and accompanying text.
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it so that a provider should be reluctant to sue in the first place.
A private cause of action, therefore, will be of limited utility in
shaping consumer or operator behaviors.
Conversely, given the online nature of the platform economy,
platform operators are better suited relative to traditional firms to
educate consumers about conscious and unconscious bias.216
Operators also are better situated to utilize algorithms to detect
such bias and to take steps to limit the participation of particular
raters in the reputation system.217 Thus, a regulatory framework
might feasibly require a platform operator to (1) educate each
consumer about bias before the consumer may engage a provider
on the operator’s platform, (2) employ algorithms to detect bias in
its reputation system, and (3) further educate or limit the access of
raters identified as potentially biased. Such a framework would
likely prove far more effective at reducing ratings bias than would
a right in the provider to bring a private cause of action against
the operator for reliance on discriminatory consumer ratings of
the provider.
Accordingly, the regulatory framework should contain, at a
minimum, the following general proscription and set of specific
prescriptions for platform operators. As an initial matter,
regulation should explicitly provide that it is wrong and prohibited
for a platform operator to knowingly or recklessly rely on ratings
that are biased based on a protected category.218 Protected
categories should be specified and might include, at a minimum,
certain traits that are both frequently the basis for discrimination
and relatively easily discernible by the platform consumer, such as
race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, sexual
orientation, and gender identity.219

216. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (noting that the platform is
structured to allow the platform operator to easily communicate with a platform consumer
with each transaction).
217. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
218. Cf. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 249 (calling for firms of a certain size, among
other entities, to “have an explicit obligation to curtail and not to facilitate discrimination by
their customers”).
219. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (2019) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of “race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical
disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status,
sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and
veteran status”).
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In addition to this general proscription, regulation should set
forth the specific affirmative steps that all platform operators must
take to mitigate reputation systems discrimination. Regulation
should require operators to educate consumers by informing
consumers that the operator is prohibited from relying on biased
ratings and that the operator is required to take action against
consumers whom the operator concludes are likely to have
submitted biased ratings.220 Operators should be required to adopt
a policy prohibiting invidious discrimination in connection with
the submission of ratings and should be required to structure their
platform so that a consumer initially may not engage a provider on
the platform unless and until the consumer has expressly agreed to
abide by the platform’s nondiscrimination policy with respect to
reputation systems.221 The platform consumer appropriately
should bear this minimal burden and other burdens set out below
even though a non-platform consumer is not required to do so,
given that the platform consumer performs a relatively greater
supervisory function with respect to providers.222
For two reasons, a platform consumer should complete this
initial education with respect to a platform’s antidiscrimination
policy prior to engaging a provider on the platform, rather than
merely before the consumer submits a rating on the platform. First,
ideally, the education may positively influence the consumer’s
interaction with the provider. Second, allowing the consumer to
engage a provider on the platform and only then requiring that the
consumer complete education prior to offering a rating in the

220. Harman, supra note 73 (suggesting that platform operators might reduce
reputation systems bias by “post[ing] anti-discrimination policies much more prominently
on their websites and offer[ing] anti-racism training”); Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our
Commitment to Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1405/
airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy—our-commitment-to-inclusion-and-respect (last visited
Mar. 14, 2020) (“If the host improperly rejects guests on the basis of protected class, or uses
language demonstrating that his or her actions were motivated by factors prohibited by this
[antidiscrimination] policy, Airbnb will take steps to enforce this policy, up to and including
suspending the host from the platform.”).
221. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 251 (arguing that a firm might curtail
customer discrimination by declaring that the firm will not accede to a customer’s
discriminatory preference and requiring that its customers promise not to discriminate);
Murphy, supra note 90, at 10–11, 19–20 (outlining Airbnb’s policy requiring users of its
platform to agree to its nondiscrimination policy and providing that a user may not engage
in a transaction on the platform until she so agrees).
222. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
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platform’s reputation system would tend to discourage consumers
from submitting ratings.223
Regulation should require all platform operators to take further
steps to enforce their antidiscrimination policies. First, regulation
should require operators to employ algorithms to try to detect bias
in connection with the submission of ratings by platform
consumers.224 Second, regulation should require operators to take
action with respect to consumers whom the operator concludes are
likely to have submitted biased ratings, either because the ratings
are overtly biased or because an algorithm has alerted the operator
to a likelihood of bias.225 Remedial action might include additional
education for the consumer on bias or, in the alternative,
termination of the consumer’s privilege to participate in the
operator’s reputation system.226
Regulation should favor education over exclusion, however,
and should guard against a platform operator’s natural tendency to
take the path of least resistance. Thus, except with respect to
platform consumers who have continued to offer biased ratings
after additional education, regulation should require operators to
offer consumers who have been identified as offering potentially
biased ratings the choice between either additional bias education
for the consumer or termination of the consumer’s privilege to rate
platform providers. If the consumer chooses the former, the

223. See Levy & Barocas, supra note 30, at 1228 (“If platforms ask users to complete more
detailed reviews—and therefore spend more time and thought on their assessments—
platforms may find that fewer users are willing to even complete the process.”).
224. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 45, at 133 (“One might imagine a variety of
societal goals being achieved in part by the platforms applying machine-learning techniques
to their data to detect patterns corresponding to, say, discriminatory practices, much like
credit card issuers use automated systems to detect criminal fraud.”); Harman, supra note 73
(suggesting that platform operators reduce reputation systems discrimination by means of
algorithms designed to detect biased ratings); Katz, supra note 22, at 1120 (suggesting that
platform operators “us[e] algorithmic filtering to detect unfair or biased reviewers”).
225. See Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy, supra note 220 (“Hosts who demonstrate a
pattern of rejecting guests from a protected class (even while articulating legitimate reasons)
undermine the strength of our community by making potential guests feel unwelcome,
and Airbnb may suspend hosts who have demonstrated such a pattern from
the Airbnb platform.”).
226. Cf. Jessi Hempel, For Nextdoor, Eliminating Racism Is No Quick Fix, WIRED (Feb. 16,
2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/for-nextdoor-eliminating-racism-is-no-quick-fix/
(discussing Nextdoor’s efforts to reduce racial profiling on its social network by not allowing
users to post about race in an incident description unless the user first fills in specified
additional distinguishing information).
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operator should be required to offer the consumer online education
designed to combat conscious and unconscious bias.227 Finally, the
operator should be required to ensure that the consumer
has successfully completed that online training prior to the
operator reenabling the consumer to participate in the operator’s
reputation system.
My suggested approach to regulation that would require a
platform operator to utilize its own data in an effort to detect and
mitigate reputation systems bias has much to recommend it over
an approach that would, instead, require the operator to turn over
its data to government regulators for the regulators’ use in their
antidiscrimination efforts. Indeed, Arun Sundararajan has argued
more generally that this type of “data-driven delegation” of
regulation, which “asks a platform [operator] to leverage its data to
ensure compliance with a set of laws in a manner geared towards
delegating responsibility to the platform [operator],” has several
advantages as an approach to regulation of the platform economy
versus traditional regulatory models.228 First, the platform operator
is likely to possess relatively greater competence to leverage its own
data to serve the purposes of the regulation.229 Moreover, the
operator’s use of its own data is likely to be relatively more
efficient,230 to raise relatively fewer privacy concerns,231 and to pose
relatively fewer risks of leakage of the operator’s proprietary data
to a competitor.232
D. A Private Cause of Action for Providers Should Be Structured
to Avoid Unduly Disincentivizing the Use of Reputation Systems
In considering how best to structure regulation aimed at
mitigating reputation systems bias in the platform workplace, it is
essential to appreciate the ways in which reputation systems
themselves may mitigate bias. Specifically, reputation systems

227. For a set of suggested principles to guide the design of workplace unconscious
bias training, see Joelle Emerson, Don’t Give Up on Unconscious Bias Training—Make It Better,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/dont-give-up-on-unconsciousbias-training-make-it-better.
228. SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 34, at 155.
229. Id. at 156.
230. Id. at 157.
231. Id. at 156–57.
232. Id. at 157.
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likely reduce “statistical discrimination” grounded in group-based
stereotypes that may have some basis in fact but may not apply to
any particular member of the group.233 When a consumer or firm
lacks information about a specific worker’s history or abilities
critical to making a hiring decision, the decisionmaker is more
likely to rely upon group stereotypes in making the decision.234 For
example, the decisionmaker might assume that a relatively older
candidate is less energetic than a significantly younger candidate.
Reputation systems can supply the critical information specific to a
particular worker’s history or abilities so that the decisionmaker
will come to rely upon the worker’s reputation score or reviews
rather than upon a group stereotype.235 As Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
has argued, “an important potential upside of new reputation
tracking technologies is their potential to displace statistical
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, appearance, and
other easily observable characteristics.”236
In a similar vein, reputation systems also might offset the
natural tendency that people have to trust persons similar to
themselves more than they trust persons dissimilar to
themselves.237 A 2017 study by Bruno Abrahao and his colleagues
provides evidence of this impact of reputation systems in the
specific context of the platform economy.238 Abrahao and his
co-researchers looked at one million requests for accommodations
on Airbnb and considered the effect of similarity between potential

233. See generally Strahilevitz, Less Regulation, More Reputation, in THE REPUTATION
SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD, supra note 12, at 63.
“Statistical discrimination occurs when an individual treats members of a group differently
because he or she believes that group membership correlates with some attribute that is both
relevant and more difficult to observe than group membership.” Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted).
234. Id. at 64, 67–68; Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1683–84 (2008); see also Levy & Barocas, supra note 30, at
1215 (making a similar point with respect to eBay users).
235. Strahilevitz, supra note 233, at 64 (“Reputation tracking tools . . . provide detailed
information about individuals, thereby reducing the temptation for decision makers to rely
on group-based stereotypes.”); Ruomeng Cui et al., Reducing Discrimination with Reviews in
the Sharing Economy: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb, 66 MGMT. SCI. 1071, 1087 (2020)
(empirical study involving fictional Airbnb guests finding that “a positive review can
significantly reduce the observed racial discrimination based on a name’s perceived
racial origin.”).
236. Strahilevitz, supra note 233, at 64.
237. See Bruno Abrahao et al., Reputation Offsets Trust Judgments Based on Social Biases
Among Airbnb Users, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9848 (2017).
238. Id.
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guest and potential host with respect to age and gender on the
willingness of the potential guest to request an accommodation
from the potential host.239 Their study found “higher tolerance for
individuals at farther social distance [as measured by differences in
age and gender] between guests and their selected hosts as the
reputation of the host got better.”240
Thus, regulators who seek to lessen reputation systems bias in
the platform workplace should be careful not to unduly
disincentivize the use of reputations systems, lest regulation result
in a net increase in invidious bias against platform providers.241
Moreover, a structural-purposive approach to regulation of bias in
platform reputation systems should be cognizant of not only the
importance of reputation systems to the livelihoods of platform
providers, but also of their critical significance to platform
consumers and operators. As noted, reputation systems increase
accountability and reduce information asymmetries, thereby
helping consumers and operators to avoid the “lemons problem”
that otherwise would plague the platform.242 Thus, reputation
systems are critical to the operator’s ability to leverage network
effects that are of crucial importance to the success and even the
viability of the platform.243
Accordingly, any private cause of action for platform providers
to vindicate their interests protected under the regulation should
be structured so as not to unduly discourage consumer
participation in or operator reliance upon reputation systems;244 the
value to platform consumers and operators of using reputation
systems should outweigh the burdens of regulation. Applying this
principle, regulation should exempt consumers from liability

239. Id. at 9853.
240. Id.
241. Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 233, at 69 (“By making the media liable for publishing

individuals’ criminal histories or making it expensive for reporters to obtain aggregated
criminal history information that is already in the government’s hands, information privacy
protections can run counter to antidiscrimination interests.” (citations omitted)); Strahilevitz,
supra note 234, at 1676, 1688.
242. See supra notes 33–47 and accompanying text.
243. Spitko, supra note 2, at 435–36 (discussing the relationship between quality control
standards and network effects in the platform economy).
244. To be clear, the platform provider’s private cause of action would be to address
injuries arising from the platform operator’s reliance upon biased ratings, but not for injuries
arising from the operator’s failure to prevent biased ratings.
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altogether and should employ a deferential standard of liability
for operators.
A platform provider’s private cause of action under the
regulation should be against the platform operator who relied upon
biased ratings but not against the platform consumer who offered
biased ratings.245 Employment discrimination law generally does
not impose liability on a consumer even when the employer was
motivated in taking its adverse action against its employee by a
desire to please the consumer.246 As discussed above, this approach
is grounded principally in a desire to spare individuals from the
significant compliance costs associated with antidiscrimination
statutes.247 In addition, as noted, efficiency and privacy concerns
also support this approach.248
In the case of a platform consumer, any significant risk of
liability arising from participation in a platform operator’s
reputation system would likely cause the consumer to refrain from
participating.249 Consumers as a group gain a great deal from
offering ratings in the operator’s reputation system. Indeed, their
participation as a group is necessary for the reputation system to
perform its function of signaling platform provider trustworthiness
to consumers. But any individual consumer gains little from her
individual rating of a provider. She might refrain from offering any
ratings and still rely fruitfully upon the ratings offered by the other
consumers in the operator’s network. Therefore, a prudent
consumer will refrain from offering a negative rating when the
regulation framework imposes a significant risk on the consumer

245. The regulatory framework also should give to the provider a right of access to
reputation systems data concerning the provider to facilitate the provider’s prosecution of
the private cause of action. Cf. Katz, supra note 22, at 1120–21 (suggesting that legislatures
consider regulation requiring greater transparency with respect to platform reputation
systems ratings).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018) (defining an “unlawful employment practice” as
one taken by an employer) and § 2000e(b) (defining the term “employer”); see also Flake,
supra note 25, at 1178 (“[E]mployment discrimination liability extends only to employers,
whereas customers face no repercussions under the law for either their direct or indirect
discriminatory actions against employees.”).
247. See supra notes 192–98 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
249. See Rule & Singh, supra note 119, at 189 (discussing the tendency of consumers to
self-censor on eBay’s former reputation system for fear of receiving a retaliatory negative
rating from a seller).
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for offering that negative rating.250 The end result of such a
framework would be a reputation system that fails to distinguish
meaningfully between high-quality providers and low-quality
providers.251 For this reason, in addition to the reasons discussed
above, the regulatory framework should exempt even consumers
who offer biased ratings from potential liability arising from a
provider’s private cause of action.
A platform operator is situated quite differently from a
platform consumer with respect to the ability to minimize
involvement in the platform’s reputation system. The operator’s
heavy reliance on a reputation system is inherent to the operator’s
business model.252 Thus, the operator would not be able to easily or
cheaply avoid the burdens of regulation targeting reputation
systems bias in the platform workplace. Still, there remains the
question of how deferential a standard of liability to apply in
evaluating the operator’s bias mitigation efforts.
Several academics have proposed a negligence or
reasonableness standard of liability for firms that utilize consumer
ratings to manage their workforce, pursuant to which a firm would
be liable for relying on biased customer reviews if the firm failed to
take reasonable steps to mitigate such customer bias.253 The
reasonableness standard, however, would introduce a great deal of
uncertainty into the platform operator’s task of mitigating
reputation systems bias. One might expect that reasonable people
will disagree as to what constitutes a reasonable effort to address
bias in a platform reputation system. Consider, for example,
Katharine Bartlett and Mitu Gulati’s proposed rule that “would
only require firms to take reasonable steps calculated to end the
250. See BALARAM, supra note 111, at 45 (“[Platform users] may abstain from the review
process altogether to avoid the risk of retaliation.”).
251. See Tom Slee, Some Obvious Things About Internet Reputation Systems,
TOMSLEE.NET (Sept. 29, 2013), http://tomslee.net/2013/09/some-obvious-things-aboutinternet-reputation-systems.html (speculating that “[c]ollusion and fear of retaliation are the
reasons why there are essentially no reviews less than [the highest rating of] five stars” of
drivers on the French long-distance ridesharing platform BlaBlaCar).
252. See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.
253. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 253 (proposing a duty on firms that are already
subject to antidiscrimination laws “to take reasonable steps calculated to end the harmful
effects of discrimination by their customers”); Flake, supra note 149, at 2214–26 (“[E]mployers
should be held to a negligence standard in customer feedback discrimination cases, whereby
they would be liable if they knew, or had reason to know, the feedback was biased and failed
to act reasonably in response.”); Flake, supra note 25, at 1220.
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harmful effects of discrimination by its customers.”254 After
asserting that customer evaluations are “notoriously biased,”
Bartlett and Gulati conclude that, under their reasonableness
standard, firms “should not rely on these evaluations unless they
find a way to negate that bias.”255 To the contrary, Dallan Flake has
asserted that his proposed reasonableness standard for mitigating
customer discrimination would not require the negation of
customer bias.256
With respect to the design of bias mitigation efforts, my
proposal relying upon a set of specific prescriptions with which all
platform operators must comply would result in comparatively less
uncertainty. In essence, my proposed regulation framework would
require regulators to decide beforehand, ideally with expert
assistance, what a reasonable operator should do to mitigate
reputation systems discrimination on its platform. The regulators’
conclusions with respect to what is reasonable would then be set
forth in a list of mandates applicable to platform operators across
the board. Thus, operators would have certainty up front as to what
is required of them. Consequently, litigation and related expenses
should be greatly reduced.
Moreover, across-the-board application may make certain steps
reasonable when those very steps otherwise would not have been
feasible. For example, a platform operator that requires a platform
consumer to be educated about bias before the consumer may use
the operator’s platform to engage a provider will be disadvantaged
relative to a platform operator that does not impose such an
education prerequisite. To avoid the inconvenience of receiving
education, the consumer may forgo using the first operator’s
platform and, instead, simply migrate to the second
operator’s platform.
In addition to providing greater certainty for platform
operators, my proposed regulatory scheme also would be more
certain to bring about meaningful reform relative to a cause of

254. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 95, at 253.
255. Id.
256. See Flake, supra note 149, at 2223 (asserting that, under his proposed negligence

standard for customer discrimination, “liability would not necessarily hinge on an
employer’s ability to eliminate the discrimination altogether but rather its reasonable efforts
to do so”).
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action for negligent design and monitoring. As noted above, the
nature of reputation systems bias will make it extremely difficult
for a platform provider to bring a successful action demonstrating
that invidious bias significantly impacted her reputation score, let
alone that the operator’s negligent design or monitoring of its
reputation system contributed to her injury.257 Thus, an operator’s
fear of successful litigation against it is far less likely to shape its
behavior than is an across-the-board set of specific mandates.
With respect to the implementation of bias mitigation efforts,
the reasonableness standard is far less deferential to firms than is
the traditional framework, which requires proof of intent to
discriminate or a showing of disparate impact that the employer
does not subsequently demonstrate to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity.258 Given the importance of reputation
systems to platform operators and users, the difficulty for an
operator of detecting bias in a reputation system, and the operator’s
lack of direct control over platform consumers who offer ratings, I
propose an “actual malice” standard as the measure of liability for
the platform provider’s private cause of action. This standard is
situated in between the two poles of reasonableness on the one
hand and discriminatory intent/disparate impact on the other.259
The actual malice standard would require the platform provider to
show that the platform operator relied upon biased reputation
system ratings with knowledge that those ratings were biased or
with reckless disregard of whether those ratings were biased.260 The
operator would act with reckless disregard if it relied upon biased
reputation system ratings with a high degree of awareness
of probable bias or serious doubt as to whether the ratings
were unbiased.261

257. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 151–68 and accompanying text.
259. Cf. Flake, supra note 25, at 1173, 1191, 1217 (noting that it is difficult for employers

to detect discriminatory customer feedback and that employers have only limited control
over non-employees’ behavior and proposing a reasonableness standard to govern employer
liability for non-employee discrimination).
260. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (defining actual
malice as making a statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not”).
261. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Reckless
disregard as to truth or falsity exists when there is a high degree of awareness of probable
falsity or serious doubt as to the truth of the statement.”).
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This actual malice standard is rooted in the traditional
workplace law framework concerning harm to worker reputation.
Indeed, the standard derives from workplace defamation law,
which addresses a harm closely analogous to the harm arising from
reputation systems bias in the platform workplace. Moreover,
the policies grounding the structure of workplace defamation law
are fully applicable to the use of reputation systems in the
platform workplace.
A defamatory statement is a statement that adversely affects the
subject’s reputation in the community.262 The “community”
includes any “substantial and respectable minority of [members of
the community].”263 Thus, any statement impugning the ability of
a worker to perform her job is almost certainly defamatory.264
The Restatement (Second) Torts sets out the elements of the
modern defamation tort: “(a) a false and defamatory statement
concerning another;265 (b) an unprivileged publication to a third
party;266 (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher;267 and (d) either actionability of the statement
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (“A communication is defamatory if it
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”).
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e.
264. Shannon v. Taylor AMC/Jeep, Inc., 425 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(“Slander per se is found where the words spoken are false and malicious and are injurious
to a person in his or her profession or employment.”); Matthew W. Finkin & Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Solving the Employee Reference Problem: Lessons from the German Experience, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. 387, 393 (2009) (“The utterance (or ‘publication’) to any third party of an
erroneous fact that injures a person’s ability to practice her trade or profession—in most
jurisdictions, her ability to secure a job—works a defamation.”).
265. In general, a defamatory statement must be one of fact to be actionable.
A statement of opinion may be actionable, however, provided that the listener would
reasonably assume, given the nature of the statement and the circumstances surrounding its
publication, that the opinion is grounded in specific facts that themselves would be
actionable as defamation if the defendant were to publish those facts. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566.
266. Publication has a specialized meaning in defamation law that is broader than the
common understanding of the term publication. Publication in defamation law is the
“communication [of the defamatory statement] intentionally or negligently to one other than
the person defamed.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577.
267. Where the defamatory statement is on a matter of public concern and the plaintiff
is either a public official or a public figure, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the defendant made the statement with actual malice—that is, that the
defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
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irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused
by the publication.”268
Where the public interest in certain speech is sufficiently great,
a speaker will enjoy an absolute privilege to engage in defamatory
speech.269 Thus, statements made in judicial proceedings,270 in
legislative proceedings,271 by executive branch officials within the
scope of their duty,272 and communications between spouses273
enjoy an absolute privilege against a civil action for defamation.
An absolute privilege cannot be lost regardless of the speaker’s
fault or motive.274
Where the public interest in certain speech does not support an
absolute privilege, yet the speech nonetheless promotes a
sufficiently important interest of either the public, the speaker, the
recipient, or a third person, then the speaker may enjoy a qualified

376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A. For the purposes of
constitutional defamation, a public figure is a person who has achieved fame or notoriety for
all purposes or who has voluntarily become a limited public figure by assuming a central
role in a public controversy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. In the workplace context generally, and
in the context of reputation systems within the platform workplace specifically, the
communication is not likely to be a matter of public concern, as defamation law defines that
term. Moreover, the object of the statement is likely to be a private figure. Thus, these
constitutional limits on defamation law are unlikely to apply. See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 284 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that
defamation litigation in the workplace context almost always involves a private individual
suing a non-media defendant).
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558. A defamatory statement is actionable
irrespective of special harm where the statement is libel or is slander per se. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569–570. The categories of slander per se include a statement that
impugns the plaintiff in her profession, accuses the plaintiff of a serious crime, imputes to
the plaintiff a loathsome disease, or suggests that the plaintiff has engaged in serious sexual
misconduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 571–574.
269. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 585, cmt. a (“The public interest in
securing the utmost freedom to those who preside over judicial proceedings, or who
otherwise perform a judicial function, is so important as to preclude inquiry in a civil action
into the motive or purpose of such an officer.”).
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 586–589.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 590–590A.
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591.
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 592.
274. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586, cmt. a (the absolute privilege for
certain statements made by an attorney “protects the attorney from liability in an action for
defamation irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its
truth, or even his knowledge of its falsity”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 592, cmt. a
(the absolute privilege for certain spousal communications protects the speaker from an
action for defamation “although the matter communicated is known to be false and the
purpose of the communication is altogether improper”).
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privilege to engage in defamatory speech.275 In the case of a
qualified privilege, the law seeks to balance the interest of the
defamed person in the protection of her reputation against the
relevant interest in the defamatory speech.276 Thus, the speaker may
lose the protection of the qualified privilege where the speaker
abuses the privilege.277 Among the circumstances that constitute
such abuse is where the speaker makes the statement with actual
malice—that is, where the speaker has knowledge of the
statement’s falsity or acts in reckless disregard as to the statement’s
truth or falsity.278 The speaker acts in reckless disregard when she
has “a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or serious doubt
as to the truth of the statement.”279
In the specific context of workplace speech, a qualified privilege
reflects a balancing of the worker’s interest in her occupational
reputation against the interest of employers and the public “in open
and candid communications between employers, by employers
with licensing or regulatory authorities, and among employees of
the same employer, concerning the skills, performance, capabilities,
and character of employees and former employees.”280
Thus, certain categories of workplace communications frequently
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593–598.
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 593, cmt. c.
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 599–605A. The defamation defendant has the

burden to demonstrate that the privilege exists. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613(2);
Denardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672, 679 (Alaska 2006). Once the defendant carries this burden, the
defamation plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the privilege has been lost through
abuse. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613(1)(h); Denardo, 147 P.3d at 679; Churchey v.
Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1346 (Colo. 1988).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600; Denardo, 147 P.3d at 679; Gambardella v.
Apple Health Care, Inc., 969 A.2d 736, 744 (Conn. 2009). The speaker abuses the qualified
privilege also where the speaker acts for a purpose other than the purpose for which the
privilege is given, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603, communicates the defamatory
matter to a person the speaker does not reasonably believe has a need to know the
information to promote the privilege’s purpose, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 604, or
communicates defamatory matter that the speaker does not reasonably believe needs to be
communicated to achieve the privilege’s purpose, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 605.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 cmt. b; see also Jackson v. Columbus, 117
Ohio St. 3d 328, 2006-Ohio-2096, 883 N.E.2d 1060, at ¶10 (“The phrase ‘reckless disregard’
applies when a publisher of defamatory statements acts with a high degree of awareness of
their probable falsity or when the publisher in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
280. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 6.01, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also Bals v.
Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1355–56 (Ind. 1992) (discussing the competing employee
and employer interests accommodated by the qualified privilege protecting
personnel evaluations).
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give rise to a qualified privilege.281 These categories include
external employment references, internal employer evaluations,
communications to an employee concerning the employer’s
reasons for disciplining the employee, and employer
communications with the firm’s customers.282
With respect to external employment references, the qualified
privilege that a worker’s former employer enjoys to provide an
evaluation of her work to the worker’s prospective employer
reflects the prospective employer’s compelling need for this
information.283 The privilege also reflects the interest of the public
in enabling employers to “determine which prospective employees
are best suited for efficient and productive service and if they have
committed violent acts against, or otherwise inflicted harm on,
coworkers, customers, or others in ways that indicate risks if given
the position sought.”284 The former employer loses the qualified
privilege when it acts with actual malice—that is, when it
communicates false defamatory information concerning the worker
knowing that the information is false or in reckless disregard as to
its truth or falsity.285 The prospective employer, however, does
not incur any liability for merely relying upon the false and
defamatory reference.
My proposed regulatory framework for mitigating reputation
systems bias in the platform workplace essentially would borrow
from the structure of workplace defamation law but would extend
liability to the platform operator that merely relies upon a biased
reputation system, provided that the operator knows when it relies
that its reputation system is biased with respect to the platform
provider at issue or relies in reckless disregard as to such bias.286

281. See, e.g., Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1346 (listing categories of workplace
communications protected by a qualified privilege against defamation claims).
282. GLYNN ET AL., supra note 267, at 298.
283. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 6.02, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
284. Id.; see also Calero v. Del. Chem. Corp., 228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (Wis. 1975) (noting
that “[t]here is social utility in encouraging the free flow of information between” a
worker’s former employer and her prospective employer); Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra
note 264, at 393–94 (noting that societal interests ground the qualified privilege for
employment references).
285. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 6.02(b).
286. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protects a platform operator from
liability for merely republishing platform consumer ratings. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018). See
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This extension of liability reflects a rebalancing of relevant interests
in the context of the platform workplace. The principal interests
that are reflected in the structure of workplace defamation law are
equally relevant in the context of reputation systems in the platform
workplace. Comparable to a prior employer, the platform
consumer who offers a rating has an interest in encouraging and
rewarding good provider performance, in punishing past bad
provider performance, and in avoiding future bad provider
performance.287 The platform operator, comparable to an employer,

also Rule & Singh, supra note 119, at 181 (“[The Communications Decency Act] prevents a
reputation system administrator from being held liable for publishing material created by
third parties . . . .”).
287. Cf. Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 264, at 399 (discussing references in the
traditional economy and commenting that “[t]he first employer has an interest in using
references to encourage and reward good work and to discourage and punish bad
performance”). The platform consumer who rates a platform provider through the platform
may be liable to the provider for defamation. See Frain Group, Inc. v. Steve’s Frozen Chillers,
No. 14C7907, 2015 WL 1186131, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion
to dismiss defamation claim arising from defendant’s customer review on Facebook); Wong
v. Tai Jing, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 764–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that a dentist had
demonstrated a prima facie case of probable success on the merits of a libel action against a
patient who had offered a Yelp review of the dentist’s services); Fireworks Restoration Co.,
LLC v. Hosto, 371 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming jury verdict against
defamation defendants for defamatory web reviews); Eric Goldman, Regulating Reputation,
in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD,
supra note 12, at 54, 57–58 (noting that consumers who offer an online review “face the same
legal risks that former employers face when providing job references, such as the risk of
personal liability for publishing negative reputational information”). To reduce a
disincentive to consumer participation in platform reputation systems, regulatory reform
might expressly codify that a platform consumer enjoys a qualified privilege to offer a rating,
that the platform provider may defeat the privilege only by demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that the consumer acted with actual malice, and that a prevailing
consumer defamation defendant shall recover her litigation costs and attorney fees. Cf. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(C), (D), (I) (2015) (providing a qualified privilege to an employer
who gives an employment reference and providing that a court shall award court costs,
attorney fees, and other related expenses to the prevailing party in an employment reference
defamation civil action); FLA. STAT. § 768.095 (2005) (providing qualified immunity to an
employer who offers an employment reference and requiring clear and convincing evidence
that the employer knowingly offered false information or violated the employee’s civil right
to defeat the privilege); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423 (LexisNexis 2006)
(providing qualified immunity to an employer who offers an employment reference and
requiring clear and convincing evidence that the employer acted with actual malice toward
the employee or intentionally or recklessly offered false information about the employee to
defeat the privilege); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)–(C) (LexisNexis 2001) (providing a
qualified privilege to an employer who gives an employment reference and providing that a
court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs to a prevailing defendant in an
employment reference defamation civil action if the court finds that the lawsuit
was frivolous).
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has an interest in associating with the highest quality workforce
and promoting a positive consumer experience.288 Finally, the
platform provider, comparable to a traditional economy worker,
has an interest in protecting her occupational reputation to ensure
her continuing livelihood.289 The balancing of these interests in the
context of the platform workplace, however, should take into
account the relatively greater importance of reputation systems to
the livelihoods of providers in the platform economy as contrasted
with workers in the traditional economy.290 As discussed, the
greater vulnerability of the platform provider to harms arising from
reputation systems bias is a principal reason that regulators should
specifically target reputation systems discrimination in the
platform workplace.291 The platform provider’s greater
vulnerability also specifically supports extending liability to a
platform operator who relies upon a biased reputation system
knowing that the reputation system is biased with respect to the
provider at issue or acting in reckless disregard as to such bias.
One might question whether my proposed actual malice
standard would unduly discourage platform operator reliance
upon reputation systems, given the deterring effect that the actual
malice standard of liability appears to have had on employer
reference practices. It is widely understood that many employers
are extremely reluctant to provide a reference regarding a former
employee beyond stating the former employee’s dates of
employment, position, and salary, for fear of being sued for
defamation.292 This is so despite the fact that employers universally
enjoy a common law privilege to give a reference regarding a
former employee, which generally protects the employer from
liability for defamation unless the former employee can show that

288. Cf. Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 264, at 399 (discussing references in the
traditional economy and commenting that “[t]he second employer has an interest in an
accurate reference to allow him to pick the best prospective employee and match employees
to appropriate jobs”).
289. Cf. id. (discussing references in the traditional economy and commenting that
“[t]he employee has an interest in a positive reference, to reward him for a good
performance, or to allow him to escape the costs of a bad performance”).
290. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text.
292. GLYNN ET AL., supra note 267, at 295; Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 264,
at 388–92.
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the employer acted with actual malice in providing the reference.293
Indeed, to encourage employers to provide employment
references, a large majority of states have codified the qualified
privilege against defamation liability for employers who
communicate information about the job performance of their
former employees.294 The typical employer’s calculus appears to be
that, nonetheless, the employer gains little or nothing by offering a
more substantive reference and, therefore, even a small risk of
being forced to defend against a defamation claim outweighs any
potential benefit to the employer.295 A platform operator has much
to gain, however, from its use of a reputation system to manage and
ensure quality among the providers who engage through its
platform. Indeed, a platform operator may not have any feasible
alternative for overseeing its providers. Thus, extending liability to
platform operators for reputation systems bias under an actual
malice standard should not unduly discourage operator use of
reputation systems.
CONCLUSION
This Article calls for a structural-purposive approach to
regulation of the platform workplace. The structural-purposive
approach seeks to ensure that regulation is informed by the goals
and structure of the existing regulatory framework for the
traditional firm but also is consistent with the inherent
characteristics of the platform economy. Thus, this approach
facilitates the screening out of proposed regulation that would be
inimical to the inherent characteristics of the platform economy and
aids in the framing of regulatory proposals that would leverage
those characteristics.

293. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 6.02, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2015) (noting “the rule in all jurisdictions that employer communications about current or
former employees to other prospective employers and employment agencies are
conditionally privileged unless the privilege is abused”).
294. See generally RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 6.02, cmt. h; GLYNN ET AL., supra note
267, at 295; Markita D. Cooper, Job Reference Immunity Statutes: Prevalent but Irrelevant, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2002); Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 264, at 389.
295. Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 264, at 400, 402; Verkerke, supra note 45, at 135
(commenting that a negative employment reference “creates a risk of defamation liability
while offering few clear benefits to the referring employer”).
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The Article demonstrates the merits of a structural-purposive
approach in the context of a regulatory framework addressing
reputation systems bias in the platform workplace. Traditional
workplace protective regulation does not specifically target
reputation systems discrimination. This traditional regulatory
framework is particularly ill-suited to prevent or redress such
discrimination in the platform economy in light of the essential
features of the platform workplace.
Applying a structural-purposive approach, this Article derives
several principles that should inform regulatory efforts to more
effectively mitigate reputation systems bias in the platform
workplace. Given the relatively greater importance of reputation
systems to workers in the platform economy and the relatively
superior ability of platform operators to detect and mitigate
reputation systems bias, regulation of the platform workplace
should specifically target reputation systems discrimination. The
Article offers a framework for regulation that relies principally
upon education of consumers and upon engineering to detect bias
and secondarily upon a provider’s right to bring a private cause of
action that would utilize a deferential actual malice standard
borrowed from workplace defamation law and adapted to the
context of the platform workplace.
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